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ROUMANIA'S CAUSE AND IDEALS

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

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Second Edition.

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# ROUMANIA'S CAUSE & IDEALS

BY  
LEONARD A. MAGNUS, LL.B.

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## INTRODUCTION

THERE is so little known in this country of Roumania, or, generally, of the East of Europe, that a short account of the real factors that have brought Roumania into the war is justified at the present time, even though the inevitable lack of authentic and irrefragable historical evidence renders any such preliminary essay nothing more than a provisional attempt at truth. In any case, the lapse of time before authoritative history is issued has always been very long.

The first broad principle is that the Western nations have been screened by the Eastern—Russia, Poland, Austria, and the Balkans—from experiencing the devastating brunt of the Asiatic invasions of the Middle Ages. The fury of these assaults ravaged those countries and set the clock of early civilization back for many centuries. The West, sheltered behind this advance guard, prospered in comparative security.

The Early Middle Ages were indeed the critical period of European national development. It was

the time when the consciousness of nationhood was springing into active and fruitful life. In the West the process was but slightly retarded—or perhaps merely complicated—by the overweening claims of that pale and persistent ghost of universal dominion, the Holy Roman Empire. The East of Europe had to endure the gruesome fight against the Mongol and the Turk; and, as it adhered to the “heretical” Orthodox Church, was under the further disadvantage of being cut off from the cultural influence of the West.

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, both the Empire and the Turk, as deterrents, had been more or less relegated to the muniment-room in the castle of European thought: but, to the prejudice of Balkan peoples, their spirit survived in another form. The Balkan nations were destined either to be forgotten and relinquished to the Turk; or, in the slow course of the dissolution of that Empire, to wait until they duly fell into the power of one or other of the claimants to the old Imperial prestige of Rome; either to serve as extensions towards the sea of the landlocked domains of the Caesarean Habsburgs of Vienna, or to furnish an avenue to the open waters for the Byzantine Romanovs, who also pretended to the heritage and the tradition of the Second Rome at Constantinople.

Of all these colossal struggles, England, insular

and protected, as by a bodyguard, by all the other nations of the West, knew little and cared little.

When Bismarck in 1877, in cynical callousness, pronounced that the Eastern question was not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier, as a Prussian, as the Chancellor of a Continental European Empire, he was, at any rate, not speaking in ignorance of it. Such indifference, on the part of Germany, was a disputable matter of expediency : William II differed in his estimate, and in 1892 launched out upon a policy of Oriental aggrandisement : to us who are living in this period, it is too early to adjudicate on the wisdom of the new departure.

But English indifference to the problems of the Balkans had become a tradition, almost an *idée fixe*. The precedent of disinterestedness of 1877 was almost exactly followed in 1912 and even 1914. In 1856 (after the Crimean War), and in 1878 (at the Congress of Berlin), we conservatively leaned our strength to the moribund and corrupt cause of the Turkish Empire.

We thereby directly contributed to the possibility of the volcanic eruption of 1912 and 1914 ; regardless of the fact, that, as of old, the Sultan was the ally of the would-be despot of Europe, as he had been of Louis XIV and Napoleon. Even the Tsardom of Russia in 1878 gauged the true democratic



and national solidarity of Europe better than we did.

The convulsion of this terrific world-war has at last demonstrated to us what is the true unity of Europe; that a blow struck at international comity in the Balkans will reverberate in the fjords of Norway and Iceland, and shake the foundations of national polity all the world over. The lesson to be derived from the war is how to convert to purposes, pacific and constructive, this essential community of the free nations of Europe; how, in a measure, to re-inaugurate the ideals of the Holy Alliance of 1815, without having recourse to the brutal and obsolete caesarism of the Dynasts who overwhelmed Napoleon.

In this vast scheme of things, Roumania, too, has her place. In the dawn of European history, she acted as a buffer against the Asiatic hordes, and paid the price. As an independent kingdom, very late in the day, she had to elect to which group of powers she would adhere; and she chose the Triple Alliance. The stringencies that dictated this selection are now very pertinent study for the British public.

Those bonds might have been firm: they were based upon contiguity and common commercial interests. They were progressively slackened and snapped, because the despots who controlled the

High Contracting Parties never acted honestly, unselfishly or democratically.

Roumania at the last broke away from this partnership, under the greatest provocation : and the object of this book is to show how profoundly she was justified, and what a sacrifice she has laid on the blood-stained altar of liberty.





In reading the foreign names in this book this table of values may prove useful.

Value.	Roumanian.	Magyar.	Serbian Transliterated.	Russian Transliterated.	Polish.	German.
English <i>church</i>	<i>c</i> before <i>e</i> and <i>i</i>	<i>cs</i>	<i>č</i>	<i>ч</i>	<i>cz</i>	<i>tsch</i>
English <i>Tsar</i>	<i>ț</i>	<i>c</i> or <i>cz</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>ts</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>z</i>
Ts soft	—	—	<i>ć</i>	—	<i>ć</i>	—
dy in "didyer!"	—	<i>gy</i> or <i>dy</i>	<i>dj</i> [= <i>dy</i> ]	<i>dy</i>	<i>dzi</i>	—
E as in French <i>été</i>	<i>e</i>	<i>e</i>	<i>e</i>	<i>e</i>	<i>e</i>	<i>e</i>
as in English <i>yet</i>	<i>e</i> or <i>ie</i>	—	—	<i>ě</i>	—	—
G in English <i>got get</i>	<i>g</i> before <i>a o u</i> & <i>h</i> & consonants	<i>g</i>	<i>g</i>	<i>g</i>	<i>g</i>	<i>g</i>
J in English <i>jet</i>	<i>g</i> before <i>e i</i>	<i>ds</i>	<i>dž</i>	<i>dž</i>	<i>dz</i>	<i>dsch</i>
K in <i>kill talk</i>	<i>c</i> before <i>a o</i> <i>u h</i> and all consonants	<i>k</i>	<i>k</i>	<i>k</i>	<i>k</i>	<i>k</i>
L hard in <i>pull</i>	—	—	—	<i>l</i>	<i>l</i>	—
L soft in <i>lily</i>	<i>l</i>	<i>ly</i>	<i>lj</i>	<i>ly</i>	<i>l</i>	<i>l</i>
S in <i>sash</i>	<i>s</i>	<i>sz</i>	<i>s</i>	<i>s</i>	<i>s</i>	<i>s</i>
SH in <i>sash</i>	<i>ș</i>	<i>s</i>	<i>š</i>	<i>š</i>	<i>sz</i>	<i>sch</i>
V in <i>valve</i>	<i>v</i>	<i>v</i>	<i>v</i>	<i>v</i>	<i>w</i>	<i>w</i>
ER in <i>anger</i>	<i>ă ê î ô ű</i>	—	—	<i>y</i>	<i>y</i>	—
Z in <i>zone</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>s</i>
S in <i>leisure</i>	<i>j</i>	<i>zs</i>	<i>ž</i>	<i>ž</i>	<i>ż rz</i>	—

All other consonants have approximately the same value as in English. All vowels, *a e i o u*, are to be sounded, as in German or Italian : *ä ö ü*, as in German. In Magyar *ă ô ű* represent the long values, *e.g.*, French *peu seul* ; *pu fâte* ; German *Hölle, Höhle* ; *Müller, Mühle*. In Magyar the acute accent represents a long vowel.



# ROUMANIA

## CHAPTER I

The position of Roumania in Europe explains something of the special nature of her history, and of her participation in the Great European War.

The Roumanian people occupy the Carpathian Alps and the mouths of the Danube and the right bank of the Dnēstr. They command direct access to the Greek countries. They bar the road to the East, and block the avenue to an invader from the East.

The race that holds this critical position will be subject to the most varied influences: to pressure from the Slav, the Greek and the Oriental. When, in addition to all of these potentialities, this race is alien to all its strange neighbours, something of a very special history may be expected.

The Roumanians boast they are descendants of the Dacian colonists of Rome. Dacia was conquered in 106 A.D., and the Roman colony spread over and beyond the Carpathians to the borders of the Theiss: and to this day Transylvania is Roumanian.

The Roumanians present the strange spectacle of a Latin island in Slav territory. Their speech

is grammatically most akin to the Italian; but the vocalization is Slav, and the civilizing influence has been that of Constantinople, the Greek tongue and the Greek Church. In the sense in which English is a Teutonic language saturated with Romance elements, until it is unintelligible save to those who know Romance languages, and might properly be termed a Romance language, Roumanian, though to a much slighter extent, resembles a Slav speech built into and upon a basis of Latin. Roumania is the bridge between the Eastern and the Western civilizations of Europe; and striking as is the medley of her speech and history, she has, through all the ages of her existence, borne a vigorous and unquenchable individuality, never submerged.

The dominating factor in her *risorgimento* is her consciousness that she is of the Latin stock.

When the Romans abandoned Dacia in 271 A.D., the colonists are said to have retired into the Carpathians.

The Bolgars, a Turanian race which overran the Balkans in 679 A.D., were converted to Christianity in 864 A.D., and the Roumanian peoples were subject to the Bulgarian Empire, and the Bulgarian Church, the language of which was Old Slav, and was used in the ritual. This finally separated the Daco-Roumanians from the Latin world.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The first Bulgarian Empire was crushed by Constantine Βουλγαροκτόνος in 1014 A.D.

About the end of the ninth century the Hungarians (Magyars) made an irruption, overwhelmed the Bulgarian Empire, and subdued the Vlakhs (Wallachs) or Roumanians. The Magyars seem to have derived their first civilization from the Roumanians: they adopted Latin as their official language; but they were converted to the Roman Church by the Bohemian Bishop Adalbert in the reign of Stephen the Saint (1000-1038).

In the thirteenth century the Roumanian nation<sup>2</sup> beyond the Carpathians was organized into the two principalities of Wallachia (or Muntenia, the highlands) and Moldavia: these remained separate and independent until the union into the Roumanian State. The position bounded by the Carpathians and the river Alt was also called Little Wallachia or Oltenia. Moldavia dates from after the retreat of the Tatars, who had occupied the country for a century (1241-1345), and were driven out by an expedition under Hungarian leadership with the aid of Roumanians from the province of Maramureş [Máramárossziget].<sup>3</sup>

But the repulse of the Tatars was only the forerunner of a greater affliction; the Turks had invaded Europe, and incidentally crushed the Mongol Empire, just as in previous centuries the Tatars had subdued the Pólovtsy, the Pečenegs, and so forth, and at the battle of Kosovo (1389)

<sup>2</sup> *The Balkans*, p. 255. I have drawn on this book for a large part of my matter at this stage.

<sup>3</sup> *The Balkans*.



the Balkan nations were finally crushed; and, amongst them, Roumania became a vassal state of the Turkish Empire, but never a mere province, like Serbia, Bulgaria or Greece, and later, Hungary (from the Battle of Mohács, 1526, to the Peace of Karlowitz, 1679). The four tributary countries of the Turkish Empire were Moldavia, Wallachia, Transylvania and Ragusa.<sup>4</sup>

The Roumanian provinces fought hard against Turkish dominion: Stephen the Great of Moldavia resisting for forty-seven years (1457-1504); and, at Racova in 1475, he "annihilated an Ottoman army in a victory considered the greatest ever secured by the Cross against Islam." He was betrayed by the Christian powers of Hungary and Poland, and his son Bogdan made a voluntary submission.<sup>5</sup>

"Michael the Brave, Prince of Wallachia (1593-1601), was the last to stand up against Turkish aggression." He defeated the Turks, and, for a moment, re-united the three provinces of Wallachia, Moldavia and Transylvania, but not the Banat of Temesvár. He too was betrayed by the Christian powers who neighboured on him.

"After the murder of Michael (1601) the rulers of the two Roumanian States were still mostly of Roumanian stock, but bought their appointments at Constantinople. . . . In 1619 the Sultan sent an Italian to govern Moldavia. Nevertheless,

<sup>4</sup> *Historians' History.*

<sup>5</sup> *The Balkans.*

the national independence was not completely lost. In the early part of the seventeenth century there was a period of comparative order and prosperity . . . . under Bessaraba in Wallachia, and Basil the Wolf in Moldavia (1633-1654 and 1634-1653). They introduced codes of written law, purified the Church, encouraged the foundation of schools and monastic colleges, and promoted literature and the arts. The country received its first printing press at this time; the first Roumanian book printed on Roumanian territory appeared in 1640.”<sup>6</sup>

About this time the first move to salvation from without was made. In 1674 both the principalities petitioned the Emperor Alexis of Russia for his protection, and in 1711 Peter the Great entered into an alliance.

The immediate result was that the native rulers ceased, and that the Porte appointed the Phanariote Greeks (so named after a quarter of Constantinople), whose administration was, in general, little else than organized brigandage.<sup>7</sup>

Tocilescu says of them :

“At Constantinople there is a Greek suburb called Phanar. In the second half of the seventeenth century some families, settled in this district, became notable for their administrative ability and astuteness. In 1666 Paniotachos Nikussis was appointed interpreter to the Divan. From that

<sup>6</sup> *Historians' History.*

<sup>7</sup> *The Balkans.*

time to the Greek revolution in 1821 the office of Interpreter to the Divan was held by the Greeks as a family privilege. Their influence gained them at last the lordship of the Roumanian principalities: and in 1709 Nicholas Mavrocordato was made Lord of Moldavia. These two principalities were separately administered by Phanariot Greeks up to 1821.

“The whole system of government by the Phanariotes was one of pillage.”

By the peace of Kutchuk—Kainarji, 1774, Russia acquired a protectorate over the two principalities: by a convention of 1775, Austria, which in 1772 had partitioned Poland, annexed the Bucovina,<sup>8</sup> which had always been an essential part of Moldavia; and by the Treaty of Bucarest, 1812, Russia annexed Bessarabia (*i.e.*, the part of Moldavia between the Dnēstr and the Pruth).

In 1821, when the Greeks rebelled, the Phanariotes were at last overthrown; but the two provinces were now Russian protectorates, governed by *gospodars* elected by the provinces; and by the Treaty of Adrianople, 1829, the Porte at length was only permitted to exact tribute, and might not in any way intervene in the administration or occupy any fortified port: all Mussulman estates were expropriated.

In 1848, Wallachia, Moldavia, the Bucovina and

<sup>8</sup> In the Bucovina there were in 1869 over 220,000 Roumanians (Slavici, p. 202), and at the present time, 273,254, or 34.8 per cent. (Mavrodin).

Transylvania all rose in insurrection against their respective masters, with the object of attaining national autonomy. The Turks invaded Wallachia, and the Russians Moldavia, and by the Treaty of Balta Limani, 1849, the Sultan was to appoint the two *gospodars*: the tenure of office should be seven years; the candidates must be agreeable to both Russia and Turkey, who should both maintain troops in the country to preserve order.

In 1853 the Roumanians again rebelled against this new domination, and the country was occupied by Russian troops.

The Treaty of Paris, 1856 (ensuing on the Crimean War), at last released the principalities from the overbearing pressure of Russian friendship, and put them under a collective European guarantee; it also restored Southern Bessarabia (including Akkerman, Kilia, Ismail, Reni, and the left bank of the Pruth up to a point on a line with Huși) to Roumania, including the delta of the Danube, which up to then had been Turkish. Turkey still held a nominal suzerainty.

In the same year the seven years' term of the *gospodars* expired, and the question of the union of the provinces was again raised. Would the Great Powers still thwart the national ambition? There was now no claim actively made on the remainder of Bessarabia, or on Transylvania, or the Bucovina.

The Roumanians solved the difficulty by electing Alexander Ioan Cuza as Prince of both pro-



vinces. He was deposed in 1866, and in the same year Karl Ludwig zu Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, a cousin of King William of Prussia, but of a branch, non-reigning and Catholic, was elected Prince of the State of Roumania, which was still under Turkish suzerainty.

In 1877 this suzerainty was thrown off, and in 1881 Roumania became an independent kingdom. The price was a secret alliance with Russia; and it was the Roumanian valour at Plevna that secured victory to Russia in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8.

By the Treaty of San Stefano, however, Bulgaria was aggrandised, and Russia obtained the Dobrudja and the Delta of the Danube, "reserving for herself the right to exchange these territories against the southern districts of Bessarabia, restored to Roumania by the Treaty of Paris, 1856."<sup>9</sup>

Berlin, which was interested in whittling away the acquisitions of Russia and Bulgaria at the Conference of Berlin, 1878, saw no pressing reason not to leave rancours behind that might disincline Roumania from Russia; and Great Britain, as in 1914,<sup>10</sup> was only academically concerned with the Balkan problems. Roumania thus received the

<sup>9</sup> *The Balkans.*

<sup>10</sup> *British Blue Book*, No. 59, "His Majesty's Government cannot declare themselves 'solidaires' with Russia on a question between Austria and Serbia, which in its present condition is not one affecting England."



Dobrudja, and lost her remnant of Bessarabia, the *irredenta* beyond the Pruth.

In 1883 Roumania became the ally of Austria, and by implication joined the Triple Alliance: the conditions were apparently those stated in Dr. E. J. Dillon's article, p. 77.

Take Ionescu in 1891 recalls an interesting incident; that when the Bulgarians expelled the Prince of Battenberg in 1887, and their throne was vacant, it was offered to King Carol of Roumania. The opportunity was missed: "we refused it and committed the most unpardonable offence any nation can, preferring a present tranquility to the possibility of anticipating history."

Take Ionescu argues in 1891 that Roumania cannot rely on either Russia or Austria, but must form a federation of the Balkan States, "which can only live, if they reconstruct former history, and only admit of one political body between the Mediterranean and the Carpathians."

Possibly it was this consideration that deterred Roumania from joining in the Balkan League of 1913. It was previously directed against Austria—so it is said—and Roumania had nothing to redeem from Turkey.<sup>11</sup>

When the Second Balkan War broke out and Bulgaria, on Austrian instigation, attacked her allies and broke up the League, Roumania took no part until the last, when she intervened and put an end to the fighting.

<sup>11</sup> Take Ionescu, *La politique étrangère de la Roumanie*, p. 34.

The Treaty of Bucarest of 1913 was never favoured by Austria, who had miscalculated on the double chance that both Turkey and Bulgaria would have the upper hand. Roumania took a portion of the Dobrudja, and this unjust extension of her frontier estranged Bulgaria; and Austria in 1913 intended revising the Treaty of Bucarest by force of arms: the war contemplated against Serbia was frustrated by Italy and Roumania refusing to join, and Germany not being ready for a European war.<sup>12</sup> Austria in 1913 succeeded only in expelling the Montenegrins from Skutari, and establishing a principality of Albania.

At the sitting, August 8, 1913, of the Bucarest Peace Conference, T. Maiorescu announced that the Austro-Hungarian Government had notified its intention to submit the question of Kavala together with other questions to a revision "whatever the result of the Conference on this point may be."<sup>13</sup>

"The natural counter effect of that action was the detachment of Roumania from the Central Powers. . . . This breaking away from the 'traditional policy' of adjutancy-in-waiting to the Central Powers was indicated by the visit of Prince Ferdinand to Petrograd, and the even more significant visit which Tsar Nicholas afterwards paid to the late King Carol of Roumania, at Constanza."<sup>14</sup>

<sup>12</sup> *Serbian Blue Book*, Appendix No. 2.

<sup>13</sup> *Le traité de paix de Bucarest*, 1913, p. 48

<sup>14</sup> *The Balkans*, p. 304.

In 1913 (v. p. 75) Czernin was appointed to succeed Prince Fürstenberg to "patch up Austro-Roumanian relations."

The rest is the history of yesterday. The negotiations that compelled Roumania to renounce the unnatural alliance with Austria are analysed in full in chapter VI.

Modern Roumania has made enormous progress :—\*

POPULATION ...	In 1866 : Two ruined Turkish provinces	In 1914 : A united King- dom of almost 8,000,000
AGRICULTURE ...	In 1866 : 457,608 tons	In 1913 : 3,230,235 tons & large exports
PETROL ...	In 1866 : 5,915 tons	In 1912 : 2,000,000 tons
RAILWAYS ...	In 1866 : None	In 1912 : 3,690 kilometres
INDUSTRIES ...	In 1866 : None	In 1912 : Annual produc- tion 400 million francs
PEOPLE'S BANKS	In 1902 : 700. Capital 4,250,600 francs	In 1910 : 2,656. Capital 100,000,000 francs
PEASANT CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES ...	In 1903 : 8	In 1911 : 378
FINANCE ...	In 1867 : Budget of 56,000,000 francs	In 1912 & 1913 : Budget of 500,000,000 francs.
BULGARIA, MONTENEGRO, SERBIA and GREECE.		ROUMANIA.
BUDGET RECEIPTS, 1911, 450 million.		583 million.
FOREIGN TRADE, ,, 852 ,,		1026 million.

\* Mavrodin, *La Roumanie contemporaine*.

For the future one question remains. Assuming that in the eighteenth century there were only dynasties bargaining with no sense of democracy, with no knowledge or appreciation of racial aspirations; granted that in the fifties and sixties of last century Russia was despotic, Napoleon III, vain and ambitious, whilst Prussia was grasping and unscrupulous, as ever, but had a genius to guide her whose dissimulation was deeper than the frank cynicism of Napoleon III; will not the spirit of the modern democracy of Russia and the Republic of France have penetrated into the high court of diplomacy? When the time comes, after victory, to dictate the terms of peace, will the plenipotentiaries exert their power to obtain a durable peace?

The conditions of a lasting peace in Europe, and ultimately of a federation, are nationalism and democracy. Most of the wars of Europe since the fall of Napoleon have been caused by the territorial aspirations of the German despots at Berlin and Vienna, overriding national claims and precedents, and careless of the soreness of an irredeemable homeland. If we are waging war for Belgium and Serbia, for Transylvania and Poland and the Trentino against German and Austrian tyranny, it will be well if Russia, now released from the bondage of Potsdam, be generous to Roumania. Surrounded by a chain of complete and satisfied nations, she would have nothing to fear from her neighbours and friends.



Score out from the map of Europe such territories as Alsace-Lorraine, Sleswig-Holstein, Bosnia, Poland, Transylvania, the Trentino, and the result will be the effacement of all the points of conflict, of all specific grievances, and incidentally of all the aggressions of the Central German Powers.

The situation of countries like Roumania, Italy and Serbia is almost unimaginable to an Englishman. When Mary happily lost Calais, England became self-contained: her expansion has been co-extensive with her nationality. But Italy, Roumania and Serbia have doggedly persisted in the face of odds throughout all the centuries: every gain achieved, every advance made, has been thwarted and begrudged by those central powers who had a vested interest in their alien territories.

From their point of view, these pretensions to hold other peoples in subjection were not quite unwarranted, for the Germans of the two Empires are landlocked, as also are the Russians, and every great nation must have an adequate sea-board. But is there no means of reconciling their objects? The Germans boast that Rotterdam and Antwerp were German ports. Since the war, Antwerp, as a port, leads nowhere.

It is, when these oppressed nations shall have been completed, that the trade of the landlocked German and Russian nations will flow most easily and readily, for the mutual benefit of all: it will be carried on by willing hands.



Russia, when the victory comes, will receive a sufficient reward in other directions, and access to the sea. If on her fringe there should lie a united Roumania, including the Bucovina, Bessarabia, Transylvania, as well as Wallachia and Moldavia, a united Poland, a united Serbia and other States which should be liberated from Austria, she will be all the stronger: and Prussia may then intrigue as she will; there will be no discontent on which she can batten. Her one and principal success in this war was when she gained over Bulgaria. Bulgaria had a grievance, the unjust seizure of Silistria and Balčik by Roumania.

On the foundation of national States a European federation may arise.

## CHAPTER II

### TRANSYLVANIA

The great province of Roman Dacia, which had been so thoroughly assimilated into the Roman Empire, broke up, as has been said, into the three separate principalities of Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania. The last named is called Erdély by the Magyars (possibly from Erdő, a forest), and in Roumanian Ardeal (or Ardél). The German name, Siebenbürgen (which in literal translation is used in Polish, Čech, Swedish, Dutch, etc., Sedmiogród, Semigrad, Zevenbergen, etc.) is really derived from Zibinburg, *i.e.*, the town on the Zibin or Zeben, Magyar Szében, now called Hermannstadt, but in Magyar, Nagy-Szében, and in Roumanian Sibiŭ (Latin, Cibianum).

Transylvania, being beyond the mountains, suffered least from the barbarian migrations. The plains were overrun in succession by the Goths, the Gepidae, the Ugry, the Pečenegs, the Pólovtsy or Cumanians, and the Mongols, as well as by the Magyars in the course of their invasion; *i.e.*, it was steadily devastated, century after century, from the ninth to the thirteenth by each wave of Asiatic savagery.

Stephen I, King of Hungary (1000-1038), undertook the defence of Transylvania, and settled colonies of Magyars in it, called the settlers, the Székelyek (or the Szeklers, from *Szék*, settlement). In 1103 a Magyar bishopric was established. In 1141, Géza II, King of Hungary, populated the ravaged southern portions of Transylvania with Saxons. These districts were autonomous, and retained German law and language: the towns of Mediás, Mühlenbach (Balta Moarei), Hermannstadt (Nagy-Szében), Schäßburg (Segesvár), Klausenburg (Kolozsvár, Cluj), Kronstadt (Brassó, Braşov), Bistriţa (Besztercze), amongst others, were founded or developed by these colonists.

In 1211 Andrew II gave part of the territory to the Order of Teutonic Knights to settle and colonize.

In 1240 the Mongols invaded Poland and the West, after subduing the Russian State at the Battle of the Kalka, 1223; but were defeated in 1241 by the united powers of the Magyars and Roumanians of all three provinces.

In 1291 on one occasion the Roumanians were summoned to the Diet as a Fourth nation.

The Turks crushed the Mongol power and inherited it; and after subduing the Southern Slavs at the Battle of Kosovo, 1389, invaded the Roumanian provinces, in 1411 and 1423.

For the whole of this period Transylvania was an independent principality, governed by its own

Duke (Voivod), though generally in subjection to Hungary.

From 1411 to 1877 Moldavia and Wallachia were tributary to Turkey; but they were never mere provinces of the Turkish Empire, as Hungary itself became from 1526 to 1690.

The Reformation spread widely over Transylvania; and when in 1526 the Hungarian crown devolved on the German Emperor, Ferdinand I, John Zápolya, Voivod of Transylvania, invoked the aid of Sultan Suleiman and subjugated a great part of Hungary.

After the Battle of Mohács, 1526, the Turks conquered the whole of Hungary, and retained it up to the year 1690, excepting a strip extending from the junction of the Mur and the Drave to the East of Varasdin, following a line thence to Nagy-Kanizsa and Győr (Raab), thence by a line following Érsekújvár (Neuhäusel), and the natural boundaries of the rivers Ipoly and Sajó to Kassa (Kaschau), whence it proceeded to the Carpathians by the River Ondava. All the remainder of Hungary was a Turkish province, the kingdom of Slavonia (bounded by the Drave and the Danube as far as Peterwardein); and the Banat of Temesvár (the quadrilateral formed by the Theiss), the Danube down to Ormenyes, and on the north the river Máros.

The principality of Transylvania was independent, subject to Turkish suzerainty. This principality was bounded towards the Banat of Temesvár



by a line from Orşova to Ormenyes, and a point just over the Vulcan Pass on the Western side; and thence in a more or less straight line north to a point twenty-four miles west of Deva and fifty miles east of Arad, *i.e.*, somewhere near Zam, on the river Máros. From this point the political frontiers of Transylvania were practically identical with those of the present Counties of Hunyad (Hunedoară), Alsó-Fehér (Abă de jos, Unterweissenburg), Torda-Aranyos (Turda Arieş), Kis-küküllő (Cojocna, Klein-Kokelburg), Szolnok-Doboka and Besztercze-Naszod (Bistriţa-Năsăud), and bounded on the other side by the international frontier of Roumania in the Carpathians.

The ethnological boundaries of the Roumanians are more extensive, and the compilers of the Oxford Historical Atlas of Modern Europe, Constantin D. Mavrodin,<sup>1</sup> and the writers of the Iugo-Slav pamphlets are all in substantial agreement, as well as the authorities in the great Russian and German encyclopædias. It seems to be established that the territory of the Roumanian population begins at Moldova Novă on the left bank of the Danube in the Banat of Temesvár, mounts up to Fehértemplon [Biserica Albă, Weisskirchen] and thence to Versecz, Temesvár [Timişoară], Nagy-Szálonta [Salonta-Mare], Nagy-Várad [Oradea-Mare, Grosswardein], and thence

<sup>1</sup> *La Roumanie contemporaine* Paris, 1915.



through Borza (near Kolozsvár) to the Roumanian frontier.

The writer in Meyer and Andréevski's encyclopædia further states that the line of division between the Magyars and Roumanians starts at the frontier of Moldavia between the mouths of the Olt (Alt, Aluta) and Bistrița, crosses the river Máros, and extends as far north as Saint Marton, near Munkács. The great complication is, that in the heart of the Daco-Roumanian territories on either side of the political frontier, there exist solid blocks of Magyars (*i.e.*, Magyar immigrants or settlers), of the Székelyek (the families originally settled in the twelfth century), and Germans. The Magyars are to be found mainly in the Counties of Kolozsvár, Szolnok-doboka, Hunyad, Máros-Torda, Küküllő, Brassó, in parts of Fogarás, the Székelyek in Udvárhély, Csik, Torda-Máros, and Torda-Aranyó; whilst the Germans still retain the old *Königsboden* at Hermannstadt, Kronstadt (Brassó, Braşov), and the ancient colonies. The few settlements of Bulgarians are less incompatible, as they are rapidly absorbed both by the Magyars and the Roumanians.

Transylvania within these boundaries was an independent principality subject to Turkish suzerainty. In 1540, John Sigismund, the son of John Zápolya, withdrew from the extended frontiers, and Transylvania was once again within its national boundaries of the river Theiss.

For one hundred and fifty years (to 1690),

Transylvania was thus separated from Hungary in every political sense.

In 1571, Stephen Báthori was on the throne of Transylvania, and in 1576 was elected King of Poland: and in 1599 Andrew Báthori was defeated in a war with Wallachia by Michael the Brave, who succeeded in reuniting all three provinces for seven years under one sovereign (until 1606).

Michael, however, had to encounter the allied forces of the Sultan and the Emperor, and was overthrown; and Transylvania was overrun by the Imperial forces, and was administered by them with the result that Stephen Bocskáy revolted and was recognised by the Sultan as Voivod of Transylvania.

This fact is noticeable: Christian populations have often preferred Turkish suzerainty to Austrian rule. In 1822 Miloš, the Liberator of Serbia, said: "If you sum everything up, you will agree with me that it would be better for the Serbians to endure the tyranny of the Turks than to lie down under the yoke Austria is making ready for them. . . . If the Austrian Government, under any pretext whatsoever, marches its army into our territory, we shall join hands with the Turks."

In 1606, by the Peace of Vienna, liberty of conscience was guaranteed to the Hungarian Protestants, and Stephen Bocskáy was formally acknowledged as Prince of Transylvania.

In 1608 Sigismund Rákóczy was elected to the throne, and in 1631 George Rákóczy I, who in

1644 joined the alliance of France and Sweden against the Empire, and extended the frontiers of Transylvania.

However, this dynasty became unpopular, and in 1660 there was civil war; as the outcome of which in 1688 Apafi, the Turcophil candidate to the throne, was compelled to acknowledge an Austrian suzerainty over Transylvania—this was only possible after Jan Sobieski had delivered Vienna from the Turks in 1683.

Apafi died in 1690, and his son, Apafi II, renounced his principality in favour of Austria; but obtained a charter (ratified solemnly in 1697) guaranteeing the absolute independence of Transylvania in all matters confessional and administrative. This ancient charter, which conferred rights only on the nations of the Székelyek, the Magyars and the Germans, nevertheless held good until 1848; and the modernization of it need not have involved the destruction of the national independence built upon it.

Thus Transylvania became re-attached to the Habsburg dynasty: possibly, had she had a non-elective throne, and a determinate line of princes, she might have remained independent.

By the Treaty of Karlowitz, 1699, the Porte formally abdicated all suzerainty or sovereignty over Transylvania.

The Transylvanians were not so easily satisfied. In 1703 Francis Rákóczy rebelled, and received the support of the Széklers and Magyars: but he was

defeated by the Imperial troops, and the Treaty of Száthmar, 1711, definitely incorporated Transylvania in the Hapsburg dominions.

About this time many Bulgarians settled at Alvincz, Déva, Hermannstadt, and elsewhere.

The Turks stirred up war once again; but their pretensions were finally sealed by the Treaty of Pozarevats (or Passarowitz) in 1718.

The Banat of Temesvár was recovered from the Turks in 1718, and Belgrade, Shabats, part of Serbia, Little Wallachia and Orşova ceded to Austria: all of these were lost in 1739 (Treaty of Belgrade), except the Banat.

From this point onwards Transylvania has no independent history. In 1765 Maria Theresa created Transylvania a Grand Duchy; and under Joseph II a great national insurrection of the Roumanians broke out in 1784 under the leadership of Horia and Cloşca. The Austrian Government at this time was acting tyrannically; but the constitutional rights of 1690 were re-affirmed, and re-asserted and maintained at every diet; those of 1825, February, 1835, 1841, and 1846 stand out conspicuous.

Towards the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries, a new German element was introduced into Transylvania, the *Ländler* settlers from Baden, the Breisgau, Suabia, Salzburg, Styria and Carinthia.

Whether under pressure of German-Austrian rule or not, the Székler and Magyar classes in



Transylvania (who had many electoral privileges) began agitating early in the nineteenth century for a union with Hungary. The Roumanian population protested, and the Wallachs desired to be acknowledged as the fourth nation (with the Germans, Széklers, and Magyars) in Transylvania.

In 1848 there was a monster meeting of the Wallachs at Balasfalva [Blasendorf, Blaj], and a petition for recognition was sent to the Emperor, with a deputation. Massacres, rebellion, riots ensued, and civil war : the Magyars did everything to crush the Roumanian aspirations.

Still Transylvania remained an autonomous principality until 1867.

A great opportunity was lost by the Central Powers in 1849, when the Roumanians addressed a petition to the Emperor of Austria, requesting that all the Roumanians of Transylvania and the two principalities (of Wallachia and Moldavia, which were not yet united) might be gathered into an autonomous nation with political and religious independence, governed by the Emperor of Austria as Grand Duke of Roumania. This new State was to use Roumanian as the official language, was to have a representative at the Austrian Court (as Transylvania had from 1690 to 1848), and was to include Bucovina and as much of Bessarabia as was then in the principality of Moldavia.

The Austrians did not consent. It is a satire on the present war that the Central Powers were



in 1848 offered their present scheme of a Central Europe on a fair and Liberal basis and declined.

In 1860 a new charter was granted confirming and ratifying the old constitution, and the Transylvanian Chancery at Vienna was re-established.

In 1863 a diet at Hermannstadt reaffirmed the constitution of 1835, and proposed to send deputies to the Austrian Reichsrath. But the old franchises were restored; and in 1865 an artificial Magyar majority<sup>2</sup> voted union with Hungary, which Austria, weakened after Sadowa (1866), had to satisfy.

This was the first beginning of a Hungarian Transylvania.

Now Transylvania merely consists of Hungarian counties, which send 75 members to the Hungarian Chamber: every one of the liberties and national rights enjoyed under Turkish and even Austrian rule have vanished, not only for the Roumanians, but for the Saxon *Königsboden* as well. In 1868 the High Court at Kolozsvár (Klausenburg) was abolished.

The whole problem of Transylvania, or the Roumanian *irredenta*, dates back to 1867, and is the creation of the new autocratic Germany, as well as of the frantic efforts of the Magyar minority to retain the present domains of the Crown of St. Stephen.

The Roumanians of Transylvania have always been loyal to the Habsburg dynasty: but their al-

<sup>2</sup> The Diet was packed: there were 89 Magyar representatives,  
<sup>31</sup> Saxon and 13 Roumanian. [*Roumanian Reply*].

legiance to the Empire at Vienna may have been shaken when they were transferred arbitrarily to the Kingdom of Hungary.

Transylvanian history thus falls into five principal epochs.

1000-1526. Independent Principality attached to the Hungarian Crown.

1526-1690. Independent.

1690-1848. Under the Austrian Crown, but independent.

1848-1867. Under the autocratic government of Austria.

1867. Amalgamated with Hungary.

The Roumanians, it is true, never had any rights under the old medieval charter of independence (save that in 1291 Andrew II, of Hungary, admitted them as a fourth nation to the Transylvanian Diet).

The land was Roumanian: the Magyars in the twelfth century dwelt in tents; but when the German Empire consolidated, and put an end to external forays, they too settled into towns, and colonized the strategical districts of Transylvania.<sup>3</sup> The voluminous endeavour to prove themselves indigenous, and the Roumanians settlers, has not succeeded.

<sup>3</sup> Jung, p. 216.

But this medieval constitution does not justify the Magyars of the present day in treating them as an "inferior race,"<sup>4</sup> a "tolerated race,"<sup>5</sup> and subordinating the language and needs of the majority to the tyranny of the Magyar aristocracy.

<sup>4</sup> Roumanian Declaration of War.

<sup>5</sup> *Magyar Reply*.

## CHAPTER III

### THE GRIEVANCES OF TRANSYLVANIA

The brief history of Transylvania has already outlined what is the substance of the cause that has at last provoked Roumania to arms. But some account still seems necessary of the official and systematic misrule in Transylvania. For this purpose we shall rely, as far as may be, on foreign and hostile evidence, so as to avoid any impugnement of interested witnesses. Friedrich Naumann himself admits (p. 91) that the Hungarian system of Government ruthlessly and permanently excludes the little peoples from any share in the administration, and leaves them with a very comprehensible feeling of rancour: and (p. 81) that it was with the rise of the Hungarians that the question of the Nationalities for the first time became really serious.

Naumann is writing in 1915: it may be helpful to trace expressions of opinion back a little farther.

In 1860 an anonymous pamphlet, "*Die Sprachen und Nationalitätsfragen in Oesterreich*, von einem Romanen," was published at Vienna. At this time Hungary and Transylvania were both being more or less impartially oppressed from

Vienna. This writer states: "Hungary is comparable with Switzerland, as long as it enjoys a similar system of home rule. The various peoples should have the right to appeal to the Monarch in their own tongue. . . . In any case, a sovereignty in Hungary, a sort of State of Hungary within the State of Austria, seems to us to-day something as preposterous as the belief in a dualism in the Universe. A semi-sovereignty, both logically and practically, is only an expectation for the reversion of the whole estate. A house divided against itself cannot stand. . . . Practically a Hungarian, or rather a Magyar, autonomy would now—after the theoretic acknowledgement of the equal rights of all the nationalities—be one of the most disastrous anomalies imaginable; the immediate result would be, either the rescission of national equality in Austria or the legitimate struggle of all the races and districts for equal independence. The former would have a precedent on a larger scale in the miserable conditions of Turkey: the latter would be in itself a logical result, but would lead inevitably to anarchy. . . . A historic claim is put up by renascent Magyarism in a manner unjustified and out of date: first of all, because the historic pretensions of Hungary are being resuscitated against those of Austria, which in this respect exist *de facto* and *de iure* are equally valid; secondly, because the true and substantive historical right that unites the Hungarian peoples, comprehends



more than the Magyar race by itself. . . . What reliance can these peoples place in Magyarism, in the Magyar State or oligarchy after their bitter experiences up to the year 1849? [when the Russo-Austrian armies suppressed the revolt of the Magyars with the partial aid of Transylvania]. The Magyars in the eighteenth century kept on petitioning the Austrian government for fifty years to cede to them the Banat (which Austrian arms had liberated from Turkish rule), in order to introduce Magyar administration, and thus to enslave the Roumanians of that province who had not been altogether bereft of their rights even under the Turkish yoke."

The writer also points out that, as long as the independence of Transylvania had been respected, Magyars and Roumanians had been on friendly terms from the tenth century onwards, until in the Diets of 1832, 1836, 1844, 1847 and 1848, Latin was replaced by Magyar as the official language; and other proselytizing followed apace.

In 1877 Constantin Frantz [*Deutsche Antwort auf die orientalische Frage*, 1877] remarks: "The Roumanians seem as though they had been snowed into the mass of the peoples surrounding them without a natural resting-place: and their nationality is in the gravest peril from the Magyars. If the Magyars conjure up to themselves the vision of a Magyar world, a Roumanian world would be just as imaginable."

Julius Jung [*Römer und Romanen*, 1877, Inns-

bruck] remarks: "Hungarian history is the story of the relations of the Magyar nobility, the enserfed Roumanian peasantry and the German colonists, and of the relations to each of them of the Kingdom of Hungary. . . . The Magyar-German colonists wedged themselves into the Wallach territory. Each of the colonies, the Saxon settlers, the Székelyek, and the Magyar nobles took exclusive possession of the dominion of the country, as the sole 'nations' entitled thereto in right of conquest: while the Wallachs were nothing more than the servant, unprivileged mass.<sup>1</sup> It was a different situation from any other in the colonizations of the Germans, or of any people, whether in ancient or modern history."

In this connection from a different point of view—not less grasping—the remark of the Russian diplomat, F. N. Fonton, in 1812, might be quoted, at the time of the first annexation of Bessarabia [Kasso, p. 229]: "This people, the Roumanians, have a strongly national character: and I cannot disguise the fact, that, when I glance at the map, I feel utterly vexed that these eight millions of a people foreign to the Slavs are settled here on the delightful slopes of the Carpathian Alps, wedged in, as it were, between Slav races, and forming an obstacle to their reunion."

An impartial onlooker might consider that this

<sup>1</sup> "According to our ancient laws the Roumanian people as an immigrant population [*sic*] was nothing but a tolerated people in Transylvania." [*Magyar Reply*, 1891].

compact national mass had as much right to their ancient boundaries as the Slavs, or the Germans, or the Maygars, all of whom are of later date.

Ioan Slavicî in 1880, a Roumanian, published his great history [*Die Rumänen in Ungarn, Siebenbürgen and der Bukowina*] in German. His judgment on the conditions of his time is worth some brief extracts.

“If ever a people has worked its way up from misery and degradation, it is the Roumanians,” (citing G. von Rath [*Siebenbürgen, Reisebeobachtungen*, 1879]); and Slavicî adds: “The Roumanians have endured and still endure much, without letting it interrupt their development, without losing patience: for they feel that the future belongs to them. . . . For centuries the Magyars have been the ruling race on the lower Danube, the principal Christian people in the East, the intermediaries between East and West: during the whole of this long period they have never succeeded in becoming the social cement of their subject races. Politically, they have constituted a capable stock, but not a civilizing element. . . . When the civilizing element at length made its appearance in the East with the Habsburgs, a regulated civilizing effort could begin. The attempt of the German element to solve the task for which the Magyars had proved their incapacity, has itself only partially succeeded. The peoples of the Monarchy found in the Monarchy a sure mainstay, and loyalty to the common dynasty has

held them long together; but the German people is too remote, and the German *Kultur* has been too much adulterated with other peoples, such as the Magyars and the Jews, as transmitted to the other nations."

Hence, Şaguna, the Roumanian leader in the 'sixties, aimed at the self-education of the Roumanians in alliance with the German element, and in subjection only to the common sovereign. It was he who extorted from the Magyars the Law of the Nationalities [for which see p. 45]. "So ran the law. But the legislators, even when voting never intended respecting it. . . . No one can be surprised at the trouble the Magyars put themselves to, to force their language down others' throats: none would ever learn it save under compulsion."

In the section dealing with the grievances in some detail, the learned and calm judgment of Slavici will be quoted afresh.

To carry the story forward of the general considerations, to show how it is the elevation of one race—the Magyars—to an unjustified supremacy that has been the root of the Roumanian problem, and ultimately, the cause of any disaffection to the Austrian dynasty, a pamphlet by Take Ionescu [*La Politique Etrangère de la Roumanie*, 1891, Bucarest] provides further confirmation. In this publication Take Ionescu insists that the only possible policy for Roumania is a foreign one, and can scarcely be one of alliance with either of



the Great Powers, Russia or Austria, both of whom have despoiled essential parts of the national domain. "Neutrality for the Roumanian State is neither desirable nor possible. . . . Belgium is only neutral, in as far as it is believed that England will not allow anyone to seize it. . . . But how could we who hold the keys of Southern Europe, commanding the avenue of the Russians to the Southern Slavs and the high road to the Dardanelles, remain neutral? . . . ." He thus characterizes Magyar policy. "The Magyars, foreign in speech and origin to all the European nations, alien by religion to all the Eastern peoples; strange by its social organization to all the Eastern peoples, which are essentially democratic; odious to all the nationalities by their mad and violent policy of Magyarization—in itself a suicidal policy—the Magyars, despite their great and incontestable qualities, have none of the indispensable attributes of an apostle. They can only guard Europe against Pan-Russism, if in agreement with us, as they formerly could against the Turk, with us as advanced guard. They cannot play the part of propagator of Western civilization in the South-East of Europe. . . . Hungary must become a federative State or be effaced." The solution proffered by Take Ionescu in 1891 is a Balkan federation, which might work in harmony with a federalized Austria-Hungary. In all these declarations there is never any hostility



to Germany: the Magyar incubus is the great hindrance.

The population of Transylvania and its racial proportions are a matter of great consequence.

On Magyar statistics, according to the reply of the Magyar students of Kolozsvár in 1891, the census of 1880 revealed a total population for the whole of Hungary of 13,728,622; of whom

46.65	were Magyar.
13.62	„ German.
13.52	„ Slovak.
17.50	„ Roumanian.
2.57	„ Ruthenian.
4.60	„ Serb.
1.54	„ unclassified.
<hr/>	
100.00	

For the census of 1890 the following figures and facts are drawn from German-Austrian sources; the classification being on the ordinary language used, not according to origin. These figures are so far inaccurate, as there exist 80,000 gypsies, 15,000 Jews, 9,000 Turks and Bulgarians: some of whom have been distributed under other heads.

TRANSYLVANIA					
POPULATION			RELIGIONS		
		Per cent.			Per cent.
Roumanians...	1,276,890	57	Orthodox ...	694,890	30.87
Magyars ...	697,945	31	Greek Cath. ...	633,570	28.14
Germans ...	217,670	9.67	Lutheran ...	328,034	14.57
Others ...	58,711	2.33	Rom. Cath. ...	284,800	9.27
			Evangelical ...	208,758	9.27
			Unitarian ...	59,287	2.64
			Others ...	54,037	5.24
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	2,251,216	100.00		2,251,216	100.00
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From the Roumanian side we read that in the whole of the Monarchy there were at the same census of 1880 [*Reply of the Roumanian Students of Bucarest, 1891*]:—

Germans	...	...	...	10,170,000
Magyars	...	...	...	6,542,000
Roumanians	...	...	...	2,623,000
Italians	...	...	...	755,000
Cechs	...	...	...	7,140,000
Poles	...	...	...	3,255,000
Serbs	...	...	...	2,918,000
Ruthenes	...	...	...	3,158,000
Slovenes	...	...	...	1,128,000
				<hr/>
				38,489,000
				<hr/>

The proportion of the Roumanians in the whole of the Monarchy, on the authority of *A magyar Romanak és a magyar nemzet*, thus constitutes 2623/38489 or about 6.834 per cent. This points to a diminution from the figures for the entire monarchy, as compared with the census of 1869 [Slaviciĭ, p. 195], when there were 2,900,000—or according to the statistics compiled by Keleti Károly, on behalf of the Magyars, 2,321,000 Roumanians in all parts of the Empire, a correct estimate probably being about 2,700,000.

The census of 1890 (Roumanian reply) showed for the whole of Hungary a proportion of 54.22 per cent. Magyars and 15.9 Roumanians, with 12.22 Germans. The variations in these figures can be accounted for in many ways: partly by the emigration of Transylvanian Roumanians into Roumania; but much more by the zeal of the

Magyar government to demonstrate the Magyar character of their State. Personal and local names are Magyarized: anyone who can speak or write Magyar is set down as belonging to that nationality.

The statistics for 1910 can be found in Naumann's *Mitteleuropa* for Hungary:—

Magyars	...	...	10,050,000	...	48.2%
Roumanians	...	...	2,950,000	...	14.1%
Germans	...	...	2,030,000	...	9.8%
Slovaks	...	...	2,030,000	...	9.4%
Croats	...	...	1,830,000	...	8.8%
Serbs	...	...	1,110,000	...	5.3%
Ruthenes	...	...	470,000	...	2.3%
Unclassified	...	...	460,000	...	2.1%
					<hr/>
					100.00
					<hr/>

whilst for the whole Empire, including Bosnia-Hercegovina, the proportion of the two ruling races of the Germans and Magyars, is only 12 and 10.1 millions respectively out of 51.4 millions, *i.e.*, 23.341 per cent. and 19.45 per cent.

These figures despite fluctuations, arbitrary or natural, show the permanence of a large and compact Roumanian population, a very considerable minority in the Empire and in the Kingdom of Hungary, as well as a clear majority in Transylvania.

There are no absolutely reliable statistics; and those of Keleti are suspected and impugned by nearly every authority, as vitiated by pro-Magyar policy.

In a previous chapter the political and ethnological boundaries of Transylvania have been shortly sketched. It remains to consider how far the great majority, the Roumanians, receive justice, since they have been swept into a complete political amalgamation with the Kingdom of Hungary.

In 1868, when the dualistic régime was formally sanctioned between Austria and Hungary, a series of fundamental laws was passed, conferring equality of rights of the Nationalities of Hungary and Transylvania; enacting that the trials should be held in the regional language, where one fifth of the local Council so desired; that religious communities should be free and the schools belonging to them; that the medium of instruction should be the native tongue; that municipal Councils should be free and in the choice of their official language; that all the laws should be published in the regional languages; that all public officials must be cognisant with the local language and so forth.

All of these provisions seem to be an elementary safeguard, where a centralized alien government takes over the administration of compact masses of strange populations.

In the history of England there have been many oppressive and persecuting kings: very often religious and personal convictions have been proscribed, so as to conform to some ecclesiastical tyranny or fanatical devotion to serve the inclinations of the monarch and ruling aristocracy. But



all such notions are things of long ago; and, even thus, Charles I never oppressed the Welsh for speaking Welsh: nor did Cromwell inhibit the use of Irish. Possibly a long-oppressed nationality acquires a morbid self-consciousness, which makes it distrust everything it cannot remodel in its own shape within its own boundaries. The bond of unity with the Magyars may be, as with the Prussians, the hatred and fear of other races.

“Hungary will become Magyar, or else she will not exist,” said Kossúth in 1848. The whole evidence to be derived from the writers of the 'sixties corroborates this statement, but from the other side of the question: if Hungary could not exist without claiming and denationalizing non-Magyar territories, they preferred as the lesser evil a uniform Austrian administration. This fact the Magyar apologists pervert. “The Roumanian Nationalists are the docile instruments of Germanism: the restoration of constitutional government [sic] leaves them cold and passive.”<sup>2</sup>

However, says Slavič in 1881: “Şaguna had expressed three wishes in the name of the Roumanian people, touching the Church, the School and the Language. His wishes were granted: the Roumanian Church was legally declared autocephalous: the Roumanians were assured of the right to institute their own schools, to maintain them, and to administer them: and the so-called

<sup>2</sup> *Magyar Reply*, p. 54.



Law for the Nationalities in certain circumstances and in certain districts permitted the official use of the Roumanian language. So much for the law. But the legislators never contemplated respecting the law, even when they were voting for it."

### (I.) ELECTORAL DISABILITIES.

The suffrage in Hungary is on a basis of property franchise of 72-80 florins a year.<sup>3</sup> Voting is open, not by ballot: and the towns at which voting takes place are scattered. There is urgent need for a redistribution of seats: some small Magyar towns have two deputies for 300 voters; some Roumanian towns with 5,000 voters are unrepresented. Of the 74 deputies, 35 are sent by four Magyar counties and 35 urban communes. There remain over 33 counties in which the excess of Roumanians over Magyars is as 18 to 7.

In practice, only electors who can speak Magyar are allowed to vote; and the military are employed to bar access to undesired voters; and every device is employed, such as arbitrary imprisonment, falsification of the counting, to secure the election of the Magyar candidate. The result is that of the 417 deputies only one is a Roumanian, whereas the proportion, on a basis of population, should be 75.

All non-Magyar populations are equally affected.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid*, p. 58.

In 1884 the Slovaks decided to abstain from the elections altogether; and their suit was followed by the Serbs and Roumanians in 1892. On the other hand, there are seven Saxons who adhere to the Magyar Liberal party.

It was in 1891, when the protest of the Roumanian students of Bucarest appeared and was officially answered by the Magyar students of Kolozsvár. In that year *A magyar állam* (the Magyar State) (22 vij, 1891) wrote:—

“And moreover it is a fact that in the districts inhabited by the nationalities we find a body of officials, who in the name of the Hungarian State administer and render justice in a manner worthy only of the Turkish Pashas. We might enumerate hundreds of similar cases which all prove that the Governors themselves do not respect the Law of the Nationalities, so that even after the appearance of the Reply of the Magyars one sad truth remains incontestable, that in reality the Nationalities are oppressed.” [*Reply of the Roumanian students*].

In the elections of 1896 this public voting took place only in the large towns, thus excluding the Roumanian peasantry, who were further incapacitated by a severe examination as to their knowledge of Magyar, and by the electoral census being raised in Roumanian towns to a sum three or four times as high as in Magyar towns. In 1896 two army corps were mobilized in Hungary to preside over the elections. The result was

that instead of 80 members, the Roumanians were represented by three in the Chamber [Mavrodin, p. 7]. "The exercise of the franchise by the non-Magyars is prevented or restricted by every imaginable device or chicanery, and there is an elaborate governmental system of terrorism or repression. The whole machinery of the State is thrown into the scale against the non-Magyar voter, and his chances are rendered well-nigh hopeless by wholesale employment of troops and armed gendarmes to preserve order."

At the present time the Magyar Lower Chamber consists of 413 deputies (excluding 40 sent to it from Croatia-Slavonia), and of these only 8, instead of 198 on a basis of population, are non-Magyars: *i.e.*, 1.79 per cent. instead of 47.9.

In the Austrian House even, which is grossly packed, the non-Germans outnumber the Germans by 26 (233 Germans, 283 non-Germans), and the elections are not supervised by the military [New Europe, No. 11].

## (II.) EDUCATION.

The matter of education is one of the sorest for a subject nationality. How are the young to have adequate knowledge of their own language and institutions? What would have been the outcry in South Africa and Canada, if Dutch and French had been proscribed, and the use of the two languages not been legal and obligatory for all purposes? Even as things are, there are complaints,

if by accident one or two officials are not competent linguists. The Magyars have been faithful pupils of the Prussians in Poland and Sleswig ; they have bettered the example of their benefactors, through whose victory they obtained equality in the Dual Monarchy.

Education and Church polity are inextricably connected, for it is the Churches that founded and maintained the first schools.

Under the laws of 1868 all religious communities were free together with their schools, in which the native language was to be the medium of instruction, and the Magyar Reply of 1891 affirms that Roumanian is still so employed. The facts mentioned in the Roumanian Reply do not bear this contention out. Slavici says : " Although the Roumanians [who support their own voluntary schools] like other citizens pay their taxes, the Hungarian State contributes nothing to the improvement of Roumanian education. In 1848 the Roumanians had a superior gymnasium, an ecclesiastical *seminar* and a Teachers' College at Blaj [Blasendorf], another superior gymnasium at Belényes, and few hundreds of poor elementary schools. In 1879 they had four upper gymnasia at Blaj, Belényes, Năsăud and Braşov and Számos-Újvár, etc., and 2,932 elementary schools. But the provision for their education is inferior to that of the Germans, the Slovaks, or the Magyars.

Slavici published his book in 1880. In 1879 Magyar was made a compulsory subject in all



schools, and the secondary schools were almost entirely magyarized.

There are insufficient schools for the Roumanians, *e.g.*, at Arad, where the Roumanian and Magyar populations are as 63 to 23; the pupils at the schools are as 45 to 405. So too at Caranșebeș. Further, no private schools may be opened at all; and Roumanian endowed establishments are arbitrarily closed and converted to Magyar uses, *e.g.*, at Bélenyes [Bejuș].

There are no Roumanian universities; the Austrian government under Count Lónyay refused permission, even during the relatively happier period of absolutism from 1849 to 1867. But at the Magyar universities at Pest and Kolozsvár the Roumanian students are only 5 per cent. and 11.6 per cent. respectively.

In all the schools the names of the entrants have to be magyarized in spelling. [*Roumanian Reply*, pp. 58 . . .]

In addition to this systematic persecution and repression, by Law XV. of 1891 any parents who are considered incompetent to look after their own children must send them in infancy to Infant Asylums, where they are handed over to Magyar foster-parents and denationalized. This practice has some curious Turanian parallels: the Turks used to recruit the Janissaries by a *devchurmé* or children's poll-tax.<sup>4</sup> Latterly, during last year's

<sup>4</sup> The same principle is now in full operation in occupied Serbia (*Birževyya, Věd.*, 11 i. 17).



Armenian atrocities, "the converts to Islâm were offered the following terms: they must hand over all children under twelve years of age to the government, which would undertake to place them in orphanages." So, too, the Tatars, when they ruled over medieval Russia, took a toll of young children, as a part of the scheme of taxation.

In 1874, 1888, and 1889, a number of Slovak children were officially declared orphans and transported to the Hungarian plain or *púszta*.

These facts are mainly drawn from Roumanian sources; but the allegations are not contradicted in the official Magyar Reply; the Russian Encyclopædia (which derives much of its information, both in matter and form, from German authorities) also states that—"The teaching in the Hungarian schools must be in the native language of the pupils. In the year 1891-92 there were 28 schools in which the teaching was conducted in three languages. In 1891 a scheme of national infant education was introduced in Hungary, in spite of the opposition of the non-Magyar nations, and was intended as a step in the direction of crushing these nationalities."

Not that the grievances are only Roumanian: they, as merely the largest subject people, are the most affected. Naumann says of the Germans in Transylvania: "Where the Germans in Austria or Hungary live dispersed and affronted, they are sure of our sympathy and protection; but they should also, as far as possible, take into consider-

ation that reciprocal justice raises the standard of a nation, and that there are other nations as well who want to live beside us."

In the Austrian Bucovina, by common consent conditions are much more equitable.

There are two Roumanian Churches: one Orthodox Greek, and the other Greek Uniate, owing allegiance to the Pope but using the Orthodox Ritual. The Greek Church is one in doctrine, but national in organization, unlike the Roman.

### (III.) THE CHURCH.

The Roumanian Church in Transylvania was made autocephalous in 1868. Yet a Magyar Archbishop was immediately appointed, and a Magyar ministry was given control of the Church estates. In August, 1916, the appointment of Bishop Mangra raised a great outcry on account of his alleged Magyar proclivities. The ecclesiastical schools in Temesvár were taken over by the Magyars, and whilst 300,000 florins were allotted to the Magyar theatres, the amount assigned to the Roumanian Church was limited to 50,000.

### (IV.) LOCAL GOVERNMENT.

The municipal government is engineered so as to return only Magyars to power. In 1889 Baron Bánffy held an inquisition into all the townships and expelled or fined all office-holders who could not speak the Magyar language. By decrees of 1873 and 1874 it was laid down that all municipal

and local proceedings must be drawn up in Magyar; and all judicial procedure must also be in that language.

Yet the Law XLIX. of 1868, S. 7 provided that every inhabitant of a county in the country may use the national language of the commune at the tribunals of his district. The judge is to sum up, interrogate, etc., in the same language; and the *procès-verbal* also to be in the language assented to by the parties.

All public or municipal officials are compelled to magyarize their names, and in the 21 counties of Transylvania out of 6,588 officials 405 are Roumanian, instead of 3,310. [*Roumanian Reply*, 1891].

The percentage of the population in some of the principal counties was as follows:—

		Roumanian		Magyar
Brassó	...	36.18	...	29.62
Máros-Torda	...	35.04	...	56. 5
Maramáros	...	25.91	...	10.82
Háromszék	...	12.78	...	86.72
Csik (Ciuc)	...	12.02	...	86.92
Nagy-Szében	...	66.27	...	2.18

In Transylvania in 1891 amongst the officials in the ministries (where there should be 320 Roumanians out of the 1,726), there were only 18; and in the High Court of Justice out of 428, 10 Roumanians instead of 73.

The provisions of Law XLIX. of 1868 that the authorities in the Transylvanian and other counties should be selected from amongst men

acquainted with the local language has been utterly disregarded; and there is not one Roumanian Viscount (Lord-Lieutenant of a county) nor one Roumanian in the Supreme Court.

The administration of justice has been entirely magyarized. Contrary to the fundamental laws of 1868, decrees were promulgated continuously from 1872 to 1888 that all the proceedings must be in Magyar, all the Counsels' speeches, all official correspondence, all registrations of land (with the incidental result that land-tenure has to depend on the good will or honesty of the official translator).

The situation is not in the least comparable with anything Englishmen can imagine. Welsh is practically the only really live non-English language in England; and English is not a small local tongue of a minority. The parallel would be, if the Welsh persecuted the use of English outside Wales, and made it the only official and governmental means of intercourse and business and education.

## V. GENERALLY.

The remaining forms of persecution of the Roumanians are rather more non-descript. There is no right of association for any purpose, whether agricultural, literary, academic, commercial, trade unions, etc., etc.; even Austrian and Prussian administration is less tyrannous; Roumanian societies exist at Vienna.

Except for the Magyar and German press, there



is no liberty, and libel actions are taken on any pretext against publishers. Up to 1885 such actions were brought up before the Assize Court at Hermannstadt [Nagy-Szében, Sibiŭ], where the juries and judges were German, so that the charges failed before a non-national, but not hostile tribunal. In that year the Court was transferred to Kolozsvár [Klausenburg, Cluj], where the whole *apparatus iudicandi* was securely Magyar, and no such miscarriages of Magyar justice have since failed of effect. There is still no Roumanian daily newspaper.

The petty persecutions for dancing the national dances, wearing the national colours, reading the books published in the free kingdom of Roumania, singing Roumanian songs, and so forth, are too numerous to mention. Full evidence will be found in the books mentioned in the bibliography.

In 1892 the Roumanians petitioned the Emperor, but the Hungarian authorities frustrated the move. In 1894 there was a monster trial for treason at Kolozsvár (like the Ágrám trial of 1908); the Hungarian counsel admitted at the end to the defendants: "You are the condemned, but we are the vanquished."

The administration of the law at the hands of the Magyar police is correspondingly and systematically brutal and inhuman to a unimaginable degree. There is nothing but a reign of sheer force.

The entire policy is dictated by one motive, the



persuasion contained in Kossúth's phrase that Hungary must be Magyar or perish. There is no notion of federalism or conciliation. Thus in 1885 a charge of 17% on the direct taxes was imposed to pay for the expenses of magyarization in the County of Száthmár. The process involves, *inter alia*, the penalizing with fines or imprisonment of those who will not transform their names; all placenames are translated or altered beyond recognition or understanding by the local residents, and the expenses are put down to the recalcitrant victims. This picture might seem overdrawn; but the Magyar apologists do not dispute, but rather corroborate and excuse these proceedings; and allegations in the pro-Roumanian writings are supported by the German and Austrian authorities. The root of the evil is the dualism of 1867 which raised one of the races of Austria to a co-partnership in the profits of repression. German as a *lingua franca* in the Austrian medley would not have been unacceptable. The arrogance of the Magyars was intolerable. Now, as the price of renewing the Ausgleich (which expires on the 31st December, 1917, and had to be confirmed by the 31st December, 1916), the Magyars are demanding Bosnia-Hercegovina and part of Serbia as their patrimony.

The relations of the two partners in the dual monarchy have only been cordial, when they agree as to the proper treatment of other nations equally numerous and less favoured by fortune. Towards

the Austrians, the Magyars have always shown themselves grasping and grudging. For the good of the world, such relations do not augur any permanent friendship.

NOTE.—This book is only concerned with the Roumanians; but it is pertinent to state that in Hungary (outside Transylvania) the following Counties are almost entirely Slovak, viz., Arva, Liptau, Trencschin, Turec, Zips, Sáros, Zolyom, Nyitra, whilst Pozsony, Bars, Hont, Nógrád, Gömör, Abanj-Torna, Zemplin and Ung are Slovak to nearly 50 per cent.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> New Europe, No. 15.

## CHAPTER IV

### BESSARABIA

The district now known as Bessarabia originally formed part of Roman Dacia, and in European times has always been part of Moldavia. In the Middle Ages it was ravaged by all the hordes that poured from Central Asia and the Steppes, and it provided few means of natural defence.

When after 1711 (*i.e.*, after the treaties of Karlowitz and Požarevac, when Turkey had to recede to her boundaries up to 1856, beyond the Danube) Russia began to surge forward to redeem the Balkans and reach Constantinople, between 1711 and 1812, Bessarabia changed hands five times; it was the Russian land-road to her objective. The population is partly Roumanian, partly Little-Russian.

In 1812, by the Treaty of Bucarest, all of the Bessarabia<sup>1</sup> was ceded to Russia.

In 1829 (by the Treaty of Adrianople) Turkey had to cede the estuary of the Danube as well (*i.e.*, the Northern Dobrudja); but by the Treaty of Paris, 1856, this was restored to Moldavia under Turkish suzerainty, and included in that single

<sup>1</sup> The derivation is uncertain, Hâsdeu derives it from a rank *Ban Sorab* (in Dacian *Sarabes* head); Roum. *Basarab*.

principality. The boundary was the river Yapluk.

In 1878, by the Treaty of Berlin, Bessarabia was restored to Russia, but the Dobrudja and the Delta of the Danube, a Turkish and non-Roumanian country, ceded to the new State of Roumania.

The racial frontier of Roumania is said to be the Dnēstr; and until Bessarabia was redeemed by Russia, it never had any special name, being an integral part of Moldavia.

The population according to Russian authorities is accounted for as follows :—

RACES.				RELIGIONS.			
			Per cent.				
Moldavians <sup>2</sup>	...	...	47.9	Orthodox	...	...	1,368,668
Russians	...	...	27.8	Rom. Cath.	...	...	9,307
Jews	...	...	11.8	Armenian Gregorian	...	...	3,849
Bulgars	...	...	5.3	Protestant	...	...	44,214
Greeks	...	...	.1	Dissidents from the	...	...	
Turks and Tatars	...	...	2.9	Orthodox Church	...	...	21,900
Germans	...	...	3.1	Mahomedans	...	...	930
Misc.	...	...	.17	Jews	...	...	180,918

Between 48% and 70% are Moldavians, or Roumanians; the remainder are Ruthenes or Little-Russians and Great-Russians. The Little-Russians are, in the main, to be found in the districts of Akkerman, Izmail, Bender (Бендеры) and Orgëyev, and also in the north-west corner, the *uězd* of Khotin.

<sup>2</sup> But according to Mavrodin, 63 per cent.; and, 48 per cent. officially, but in fact 70 per cent., according to Laškov, Бессарабія, къ столѣтію присоединенія къ Россіи Bessarabia. (The centenary of its union with Russia) Kišinev, 1912.



The Great-Russians in Bessarabia are immigrants and principally represent the official classes.

There are also some Bulgarians near Komrat and Bolgrad, and 400 families of Armenians. Gypsies also exist in Bessarabia; they made their first appearance in 1417 and were enslaved between 1504 and 1509.

A few Germans live at Akkerman, and Jews are also scattered over Bessarabia.

The Moldavians principally inherit the *uězd* of Kišinev (Chişineu) and the banks of the Pruth.

The Russian administration of Bessarabia has always left much to be desired. According to Kasso [A. A. Kasso: "Россія на Дунаѣ, и образованіе бессарабской области," Moscow, 1913], Harting, the Governor of Bessarabia, in 1813, intended standardizing Bessarabia with the other provinces of the Empire; and the Moldavians tried to remonstrate with the Tsar; and in the years 1825-1828 Bessarabia was assimilated to the other Russian province. Russian was made the only official language; and the use of Moldavian (*i.e.*, Roumanian) forbidden in official procedure. Kasso admits that the early administration was very defective; but, at any rate, it was of a piece with the general government of the country. There was no differentiation against the Roumanian population, no attempt to russify them compulsorily.

At the present time, Mavrodin says, the two millions of Roumanians in Bessarabia can neither



pray, nor be taught, or read in their own language, nor receive any publications from free Roumania. "Ending this system would not only bring good fortune to the Moldavians of Bessarabia, but would also mitigate the rancour of the crime committed in 1878 against our kingdom: and Russia would completely recover the sympathy of the Roumanian nation to which she is allied by bonds of religious and common memories in the past."

It is in very different terms that Mavrodin inveighs against the Magyars.

#### THE EDUCATION AND LANGUAGE QUESTION IN BESSARABIA.

Mavrodin's remarks as to the present situation have already been quoted, and a high standard is hardly to be expected. There is no Roumanian university—but Bessarabia suffers no less and no more than other subject peoples of Russia from the disabilities and intolerance practiced up to recent times, and has no specific grievance of specialized oppression.

At all events, the Russian law on education is more generous than the Magyar, though the execution is lax.

According to Laškov, at the time of the annexation in 1812, no schools existed: the Phanariote *gospodars* of Moldavia occasionally opened Greek schools.

In 1813 an ecclesiastical *seminar* was instituted, in 1816 a secondary school, and in 1828 schools

in the principal towns, such as Kišinev, Běltsy, Khotin, Akkerman, Bender, Izmail, Reni, and Kilia; and in 1829 Jewish schools at Kišinev. In 1909 there were altogether 109,000 pupils. There is no indication in Laškov that the instruction was not in the native language and by the medium of the native language: for the five years' curriculum at the school established in 1816 comprised compulsory French, Russian, and Moldavian.

Further, the general regulations for subjects in Russian schools insist on religion, Russian and ordinary or special subjects: such as German and the local language (*e.g.*, Esthonian or Courlandish, the Caucasian languages). The medium of instruction is always the native language. In the provinces of Kiev and the south the religious supervision of non-orthodox schools is left to the proper religious authorities; it is only in Poland (Vilna, Volhynia, Kovno, Grodno and Minsk, Mohilevsk and Vitebsk) that the local language (Polish) is used as the medium of instruction only during the first two years of elementary education. [Andréevski, *Encyclopædia*].

This aim at liberality is a contrast to Prussian methods, *e.g.*, in Sleswig, where children have to be taught in deaf-and-dumb show, because Danish is prohibited. [*Le Slesvig du Nord*, Copenhagen].

Tocilescu [*Manual de Istoria Românilor*, Bucarest, 1900] thus describes the manner in which Russia acquired Bessarabia:—

“ By the Treaty of Iași, 1791, Russia advanced

her western frontier to the Dnēstr; by that of 1812 she brought it up to the Pruth, soon afterwards taking the mouths of the Danube. In fact, Russia being threatened by Napoleon with war, could no longer maintain an army on the Danube, and, consequently, would have been very glad to conclude a peace with Turkey on any conditions. Napoleon even warned the Sultan not to accept the peace which the Russians wanted, much less to approve their claims, because he had declared war on Russia. Unfortunately, the Porte's foreign affairs were then in the hands of the brothers Moruzi, who, like all the Phanariote Greeks, were sold to Russia. The Dragoman Dimitri Moruzi was commissioned to conclude peace at Bucarest and let his brother Pănaïot take his place. When he received Napoleon's message, instead of translating it and giving it to the Sultan, he sent it on to Dimitri, who handed it to the Russian ambassadors in place of giving it to the Turkish minister, Galip Effendi. Galip Effendi, being ignorant of the circumstances, seeing that the Russian ambassadors no longer claimed both principalities, but would be content with Bessarabia, signed the peace (12th May, 1812). Shortly after this treachery of Moruzi was discovered, and though rather late, he received his due reward: Dimitri was beheaded on the 8th November, and his brother Pănaïot also."

Take Ionescu in 1891 says of Bessarabia: "It was the first to be snatched from South-Eastern

Europe, on the pretext of rescue from Turkish tyranny. An excellent opportunity was presented to the Russian government of proving to the Eastern Christians that a Russian supremacy is not incompatible with a national and proper life amongst her subjects or confederates. But what has Russia done in Bessarabia? She has spared no device to denationalize it with unheard-of speed. The religion being the same, it became a tool for Russification. The lack of a Roumanian middle class made it possible to widen the gap between the peasantry and the governing classes. Russia, who in Poland championed the peasants against the nobles, has, in Bessarabia, propitiated the *boyar* class by systematic bribery, so as to leave the peasantry without natural leaders. She has forbidden, uniting violence with Machiavellianism, in this Roumanian country, the reading of any Roumanian book or paper."

Whether the extraordinary advance of democracy in Russia, the rise of a Duma powerful enough against Court influence to cast out two ministries during this war, has altered matters for the better, we do not know.<sup>3</sup>

Possibly the war has made Russia gentler. At any rate the welcome given to the Russians in this war is symptomatic: whereas the Hungarian Parliament has sat continuously during the war and has not temporized with the Roumanians. On the

<sup>3</sup> This was written before the Russian Revolution.



contrary, as soon as Roumania declared war, the Magyar Government confiscated all the funds of the Roumanian municipalities in Transylvania [*Indépendance roumaine*, 10th Oct., 1916].

The Roumanian people are evidently less afflicted in Bessarabia than in Transylvania.

## CHAPTER V

### THE NEGOTIATIONS LEADING UP TO THE WAR OF ROUMANIA AND AUSTRIA.

PRELIMINARY.—The principal authority is the third Austro-Hungarian Red Book : and the slender volume, officially issued, challenges comparison with the second, the one bearing on the war with Italy.

The contrast is very pronounced. In the Italian volume there are 205 diplomatic excerpts, no gaps or discontinuity, and full reports not only of the despatches of the Austrian Ambassador and the Austrian Chancellor, but also of the interviews at Vienna, at Berlin and elsewhere. The collection is so full, and corresponds so well with the Italian Green Book, that it is a reliable source of history. The appendices contain extracts from the Triple Alliance, and other pronouncements bearing on the Treaty relations.

For the two years of negotiations with Roumania we have only 110 documents : 25 for the year 1914, 25 for the year 1915, and 60 for 1916; and there are no documents quoted for any of the winter months; no references to the obligations of Austria under the Treaty of Triple Alliance or

otherwise, no references (save one, No. 90) to any demand by Roumania for territorial compensations, whilst the *lacunae* in the correspondence are most noticeable. Unlike the previous Red Book, this official emanation must be ranked with the German White Book and the first Austrian Red Book, as a compilation availing itself of the official devices of suppression, and, possibly, re-editing, to obtain the desired effect, that of demonstrating that Roumania for two years protested a specious and unconvincing neutrality, and, with the most bare-faced treachery, without even any skilled sophistications, at the end of two years, sprang a declaration of war on a long-suffering ally. The most improbable feature of this official tale is either the incredible fatuousness of a Roumanian government that imagined it could be beguiling the intended foe, or an Austria which would not have acted much sooner in the face of such undisguised villainy.

So much for the deficiencies of this official book on internal evidence. It remains to supplement it from other sources.

First, from Austrian official sources. The Austro-Hungarian Red Book on Italy (henceforward referred to as A.H.II.) contains some of the clauses of the Triple Alliance. Italy and Roumania both entered the Triple Alliance in the year 1883, on the same ground and with the same objects. They were both of them fundamentally embroiled with Austria, who retained lands belonging to their co-

nationals, in the Trentino and Transylvania, countries which were being systematically oppressed and denationalized. There could be no relations between either and Austria, save war or a very sharply defined alliance. Bismarck attained the latter result at the Conference of Berlin, by inducing France to occupy Tunis, and Russia to re-assume the whole of Bessarabia: the two states were too weak to stand in splendid isolation, and had to gravitate towards one or other of the great alliances.

But the terms were rigid. If Italy and Roumania were to be debarred from their natural extension into their native territories, it could only be on a mutual ordinance of self-denial; any advance by Austria-Hungary in the Balkans or the Ægean was to be accompanied with compensatory advances in territory to Roumania and Italy; and no advance was to be made or contemplated without an entire preliminary accord.

This arrangement, artificial in its essence, bolstered up through all the lighter crises in the Near East, was shattered by two great changes: when Italy waged war with Turkey for Tripoli (which was outside the bounds of Article VII.) and thus compensated herself for her loss of Tunis; and when Roumania, after the Balkan war, secured some share in the redistributed territories. The Austrian contention (in A.H. II) that the provisions of Article VII applied intact to the Balkan territories, after Turkish sovereignty was



at an end, was refuted by Italy, and absurd in itself.

The clauses published in A.H. II are cited *infra*. The negotiations between Italy and Austria were based on Article VII; and Italy, backed to a certain extent by Germany, extorted very large promises of concessions in the Tyrol and Dalmatia, the fulfilment of which was left uncertain.<sup>1</sup> So, too, the *Rěč* of Petrograd states on the 15th August, 1916 :<sup>2</sup> "Last year's experience with Italy proves which of the partners in the Austro-German firm is held materially accountable for failure in war. The liabilities are always payable in Austrian coin. Last year, Germany wrung out of Austria her assent to territorial compensations for Italy. Unfortunately, in the case of Roumania, Roumania is claiming territories belonging to the dual monarchy, incorporated not with the wizened frame of Austria, but with the vigorous energetic body of Hungary."

The clauses mentioned are—

"ARTICLE I.—The Contracting Parties promise each other mutually peace and friendship, and will not enter into any alliance or treaty directed against any one of these States.

"They engage to practise the habit of an exchange of thought on political and economic questions of a general nature, such as may arise,

<sup>1</sup> vi., "Pros and Cons" in "The Great War."

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *The Times*, 27th July, 1915.

and, in addition, promise each other mutual support in the realm of their own interests.

“ARTICLE III.—If one or two of the Contracting Parties be attacked without a direct provocation emanating from its own side, and should find itself or themselves at war with two or more Great Powers who are not parties to this Treaty, the *casus foederis* shall simultaneously spring into being for all the Contracting Parties.

“ARTICLE IV.—In the event of a Great Power, which has not subscribed this present Treaty, threatening the safety of the States of one of the Contracting Parties, and the State thus menaced considering itself obliged therefore to declare war on such another Power, the two remaining allies pledge themselves to observe a benevolent neutrality towards their ally. Each of them reserves to itself the right to take part in the war, should it deem fit to make common cause with its ally.

“ARTICLE VII.—With the intention of conserving, as far as possible, the *status quo* in the East, Austria-Hungary and Italy hereby engage to utilize their influence with the object of preventing any territorial alteration that might be prejudicial to one or the other of the Powers signatories to this present Treaty. For this purpose they will communicate to each other all items of news that might serve to enlighten each other mutually on their own objectives, as well as on those of other Powers. However, in the event of circumstances

rendering impossible the conservation of the *status quo* in the Balkans, or in the region of the Turkish coasts and islands in the Adriatic and Ægean Seas; and in the event, whether resultant from the action of a third Power, or from any other cause, of either Austria-Hungary or Italy seeing itself obliged or forced to modify the *status quo* by an occupation temporary or permanent, in all such events such an occupation shall only take place after a preliminary agreement between these two Powers; and such agreement shall be based on the principle of a mutual compensation for each and every advantage, territorial or otherwise, which either of these Powers might gain over and beyond the present *status quo*; such previous agreement to give satisfaction to the authenticated interests and claims of both Parties."

Thus this first omission of these fundamental clauses suggests the nature of some of the gaps in this correspondence. These have, as far as possible, been eked out from other sources. But it follows that, as in No. 4, Roumania distinctly intimated that no *casus foederis* arose under the Treaty, the obligation to compensate was also brought to life. The position of Roumania, as of Italy, was that of a junior partner, aggrieved by the forcible action of the principal partner, but not in a position to vindicate his right immediately. Such a victim would not be considered to be in the wrong, if he lay low, bided his time, and selected the moment opportune to himself, not to his

culprit partners, to seek redress. The complete pretermission of any such negotiations is the second great deficiency in this slim Red Book. It suggests that there is much to conceal, and good politic reasons for reticence.

Thirdly, one more general observation may be made. These despatches are purely Austrian, and their strict accuracy cannot be checked (as was the case with A.H. II, which is very faithful, and tallies with the Italian Green Book); and, on a general comparison of the style, these despatches do give countenance to a surmise that they have been edited for the gallery. There are precedents, at the Friedjung Trial, 1913, and elsewhere, of official forgeries in Austria, and still more recently at the trial of Kramář [*New Europe*, 4, i. 17], the Čech leader, when a letter sent by Kramář to Count Thun was proved to have been falsified for the purposes of the Court-Martial; and the witness to the forgery was Count Thun himself. Austria had valid reason to suspect both the Italian and the Roumanian premiers of a desire to reacquire their *terre irredente*; but in the Roumanian documents the dramatic insistence by Count Czernin on the "betrayal, treachery, lies," of Brătianu is unconvincingly frequent and indiscriminating. A diplomat would have used a style less gross, less strident, and more trenchant, especially such masters of refined and clear German style, as the diplomatic agents of Austria appear to be from their three official publications.



Lastly, before proceeding to the analysis of these diplomatic papers, it should be observed that Roumania, though it is a constitutional country, accords the King a much greater independence of his ministers, than Italy—or, of course, Great Britain. The King can apparently receive foreign Ambassadors apart from his ministers, and state his own views, and, subject to their consent, make agreements binding on his country. There was evidently some divergence of view between both King Charles and King Ferdinand with the Cabinet.

Roumania is, as one of the most advanced of the Balkan States, also one of the most constitutional, and the King has no despotic powers: a psychological fact which the ambassadors of the two Empires failed to recognise. Their experience in Bulgaria and Greece, and their home traditions may have misled them.

The *dramatis personae* in the prologue to the real conflict now being enacted in Roumania are:—

#### ROUMANIA.

King Charles and King Ferdinand.

Ion C. Brătianu, Prime Minister.

Take Ionescu, Conservative Democrat Party leader.

Nicholas Filipescu

Alexander Marghiloman

Porumbaru, Foreign Minister.

Costinescu, Financial Minister.



# AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND GERMANY.

Count Berchtold, succeeded by Baron Burián, Austrian Chancellor.

Ottokar Count Czernin (also von Wodianer, his deputy), Austro-Hungarian Minister at Bucarest.

Gottfried Prince zu Hohenlohe; and Herr von Jagow, at the Foreign Office at Berlin.

Consul-General von Felner, Austro Hungarian Consul at Galați.

Freiherr von Giskra, Austro-Hungarian Minister at the Hague.

Count Hadik, Austro-Hungarian Minister at Stockholm.

The following interesting study of Count Czernin (Austria-Hungary's new Foreign Minister), who, till last August was minister in Bucarest, is from the pen of the distinguished Roumanian statesman, Take Ionescu, and appeared in his newspaper, *La Roumanie*, a few days before the evacuation of the capital.

Count Czernin was no longer in the service, when in 1913 Vienna thought fit to replace Prince Fürstenberg, who had not been able to prevent Roumania's entry into the war against Bulgaria, and in consequence, the Peace of Bucarest.

It was the Archduke Ferdinand who chose Czernin. He had long singled him out as his future Minister of Foreign Affairs, and in the meanwhile he sent him to Bucarest with the defi-

nite mission of patching up Austro-Roumanian relations once more by means of serious concessions, which the Magyars were to make to the Roumanians of Transylvania.

Take Ionescu says:—

“I met Count Czernin for the first time soon after his arrival at the opening of the new Industrial Museum. He took me into a corner, and despite the crowd all around us, explained to me that he had come to Bucarest with the sole object of consolidating our relations by the large concessions which the Magyars were to make to the Roumanians. He assured me that these concessions would be made, whether the Magyars liked it or no; but that it was certain that Budapest would see reason in the end, since it was not merely a matter of justice, but of sheer necessity. Without these large concessions on the part of the Magyars, the Austro-Roumanian alliance could no longer continue.

“There was a measure of true courage in this firm declaration. I had no doubt whatsoever that Count Czernin was under an illusion as to the possibility of serious concessions, but it was very honourable on the part of an Austro-Hungarian Minister to acknowledge that they were necessary.

“At the same time, it seemed very strange that he should make such a definite declaration to me at our first meeting, and in the midst of a crowd that jostled us at every turn. It merely confirmed my former opinion of Austrian diplomatists. In

course of time, it became obvious even to Count Czernin that the story of Magyar concessions to the Roumanians of Hungary would remain a mere Arabian night's entertainment, and he spoke of it less and less whenever I met him. . . .

"Then when I answered that the issues of war and peace did not rest with me, he declared:—

"'You will go to war with us. That is an understood thing. It is both your interest and your duty. Why, if I were a Roumanian, I should attack Austria; and I do not see why you should not do what I would do in your place. It certainly is not a noble action to turn against an ally; but history is full of such villainies, that of Austria, as well as of other states; and I do not see why Roumania should be the only exception.'"

This article by Take Ionescu can be confirmed from other sources: Czernin informed a Hungarian journalist on Jan. 20th, 1914, that the Roumanians in Hungary had no rights: and this state of things was unjust.<sup>3</sup>

The following extract from Dr. E. J. Dillon's article in *The Fortnightly Review*, October, 1916, explains the treaty obligations of Roumania prior to the War:—

(p. 536) "As soon as Germany had burned her boats and appealed to the sword, the question

<sup>3</sup> Debate, Hungarian Parliament. [29th Sept., 1916]. *A Világ*, 17, recalling that Czernin's appointment in 1913 raised stormy protests: as it was considered he held opinions incompatible with the Hungarian Constitution.

became urgent what course her Allies would strike out. Besides Bulgaria, whose engagements were unknown to the Entente Powers, there were Italy and Roumania to consider. The latter country was allied to the Central Empires by a Treaty concluded in the year 1883, and renewed several times since then, the last occasion being in the year 1912, during the Balkan War. This compact, which was extended to Italy in 1888, was not based on that of the Triple Alliance, but on the earlier Austro-Hungarian-German Alliance. By its terms, the co-operation of the four countries in dealing with the Near East was established, the defence of the Hohenzollern dynasty in Roumania was promised in case of need; Roumania bound herself to construct fortifications against Russian aggression, not to conclude any political or economic alliance with any other State without the knowledge and assent of her Allies, and not to encourage disaffection among the Roumanians of Austria-Hungary. Should opportunity serve, Roumania's efforts to widen her frontiers at the expense of Russia, Serbia, or in the Dobrudja would be backed by her Allies, and in case Austria were attacked by Russia, Turkey or Serbia, it would be Roumania's duty to go to the assistance of the Habsburg Monarchy and place all her forces and all her strongholds at the disposition of her Ally. Lastly, if, while the Treaty was in force, Austria-Hungary should put the Balkan States under her, Roumania would profit largely by Hungary's acquisitions.



“ Now this covenant, which afterwards comprehended Italy, had one flaw:<sup>4</sup> concluded by King Carol alone, it had never [p. 537] been submitted either to the Parliament or to a Cabinet Council, and was therefore null and void. Each Prime Minister, after he had taken office, was cognisant of the arrangement, but was bound to absolute secrecy. Now the Monarch, although only a constitutional ruler, enjoyed a degree of freedom of initiative in matters of foreign policy which is usually reserved to autocrats. This privilege, however, was based exclusively on the tacit consent of all parties in the State, and no serious protest was ever raised by any of them against his openly avowed prepossession for the Central Empires in general, or for Austria in particular. But this concession neither implied nor involved a change in the constitutional law of the realm which lays it down that treaties with foreign countries, to be binding, must have been ratified by the legislature. The circumstances that this one was countersigned by the Premier goes for nothing, because he has no authority to discharge the functions of the Parliament.

“ On the outbreak of the war, Italy, who also had a treaty with the Central Empires, was considering her position, when King Carol called a

<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, in 1913, Brătianu warned both Berlin and Vienna that the Treaty could not be fulfilled by anyone in Roumania, unless full account were taken of Roumanian national interests, and war on Serbia would mean a European war. (Speech at Iași, *Novoye Vremya*, 4. i. 17).

Crown Council at Bucarest for August the 3rd, to discuss the situation and concert means of action. He was a straight, honourable man, who held that, having given his promise in 1883 to the Central Empires, it was now his duty to redeem his word. To the Ministers and ex-Ministers assembled in the Council Hall, he revealed the existence of the treaty, accentuated the benefits which it had conferred on the people, and proposed to discharge the duties of ally which he had taken over in the name of the nation. But his words evoked no responsive echo. A number of the members repudiated an obligation taken over without their authority, without their knowledge, without the usual tests and the constitutional ratification. Some, like Carp, fell in with the King's proposal, but it was in danger of being rejected. Then the Monarch appealed to their sense of honour, and asked what figure Roumania would cut in Europe, if she left friends of thirty year's standing in the lurch, especially as Italy, who was in the same boat as Roumania, was certain to keep her promise and draw the sword with Germany and Austria-Hungary.

"His stirring words made a deep impression on all the members of the Council, for they believed that Italy would take the course traced by the King. In fact, for the previous forty-eight hours, Brătianu had been expecting a telegram from Rome informing him of Italy's decision. It was already three o'clock in the afternoon, and no

dispatch had been delivered. The members of the Council were growing nervous, for a decision had to be come to in one sense or the other, the Monarch having put the question. The King, indeed, had Italy's readiness to meet her obligations as an argument. And it was undoubtedly a telling consideration; but was it true? Just as one of the scales was about to descend, and the Council, under the impression of the King's address, and on the assumption that Italy would declare war on France, Russia, and Britain, was on the point of recording its vote, a messenger entered and announced the Italian Minister in Bucarest, Baron Fasciotti, who requested to be received on a matter of great urgency. Silence fell upon the assembly; and the King, rising and requesting the members to await his return, left the hall, and ordered the messenger to usher in the diplomatist. A few minutes later, the Monarch returned, and straightway informed the members that Italy had decided upon neutrality. Most of the statesmen present looked relieved, and the King, addressing them, admitted frankly that it was superfluous, in the circumstances, to continue the discussion; for if Italy, whose engagements with the Central Empires did not essentially differ from those of Roumania, deemed it compatible with her honour to remain neutral, there was no pressing motive why Roumania should act differently."

## CHAPTER VI

### THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN AUSTRIA AND ROUMANIA PRECEDING THE WAR.

**Roumania  
persists in  
remaining  
neutral.**

§1.—On the 22nd July, 1914, Count Berchtold at Vienna instructed Ottokar Count Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Bucarest to inform the Roumanian Government that Austria intended handing in a 48 hours' ultimatum to Serbia [No. 1]. Whether or not an explanatory memorandum is suppressed (such as appears in the Italian Red Book No. 2 of the 20th July), to the effect that Clause VII. of the Triple Alliance does not apply (in view of the inheritance of Turkey in the Balkans having since 1883 fallen to the Balkan States) is doubtful: but it is probable: for on the 26th Berchtold informed Czernin that Serbia had refused the Austrian offer—in itself a gross misstatement. [No. 2]. In this despatch Berchtold emphasizes that Austria does not intend any territorial aggrandisement at Serbia's expense, and hopes that the war will remain "localized." There is implied in this note a belated admission that Austria's act, without consultation, is contrary to



the terms of the Alliance: for it adds "The loyalty and wisdom of His Majesty (King Charles) led us to expect a strict *neutrality*<sup>1</sup> on the part of Roumania. We, having regard to our alliance, would not in further eventualities take any measure that affects Roumanian interests, without sounding our ally's wishes. If Russia were to take hostile action against us, we should reckon on the loyal co-operation of Roumania as our ally."

On the 28th July, Czernin had an audience of the King himself, and the upshot of the conversation was:—

1. In a war between the Monarchy and Serbia, the King guaranteed Roumania's strict neutrality.

2. The King was satisfied with the declaration that the interests of Roumania would be regarded in any subsequent actions.

3. The King, despite his personal goodwill, would not promise military aid against Russia: but no power on earth would move him to mobilize against the Monarchy. [No. 3; 28th July, 1914].

However, other national forces were at work. On the 4th August, Brătianu, the Premier, informed Czernin of the result of the Crown Council at Sinaia. "After a fervid appeal by the King to set the Treaty in motion, the Council decided with one dissentient that no party dared take such a responsibility. It has resolved that as Roumania was neither consulted nor informed in advance of

<sup>1</sup> Italics inserted by editor.

the Austro-Hungarian *démarche* at Belgrade, no *casus foederis* had arisen. It also resolved that military precautions should be taken to hold the frontiers: and therein it was benefiting the Monarchy, and covering some hundreds of miles." [No. 4].

After this clear indication that Roumania was not an autocracy, it might have been supposed that Austria would deal with the constitutional situation, as such; but this, as will be seen, was too great an effort of imagination.

Austria evidently remonstrated with Berlin (as she did in the Austro-Italian negotiations), and Berlin persuaded Austria to accept the decision and "in future to respect Roumanian interests, but with the certain expectation that Roumania would hold her Moldavian frontiers, and guard against a Russian irruption." [4th August, 1914; No. 5].

This joint declaration of the two Central Empires had an "excellent effect," and "did more to conciliate Roumania and those Empires than anything in the history of the past forty years."

These were Brătianu's words [No. 6; 5th August]. The key-note is "that Roumania's interests would be respected by both Empires in this difficult situation."

Czernin (like Macchio at Rome in the Italian negotiations) was cynical on the situation. He said that Italy's decision to remain neutral had influenced the Crown Council at Sinaia: that King Charles was, sincerely, pro-German; but that

Roumania would join the victor, either in loyalty to her allies, or to share in the distribution of the Austrian Empire. But she would resist a Russian invasion. [No. 7; 6th August].

Take Ionescu affirmed that Roumania would be neutral to the end of the war—in a pamphlet of 1891<sup>2</sup> he argued it was inconceivable for Roumania to assist either of the oppressors of the Roumanian race, Hungary and Russia—Brătianu inclined to think that Roumania might proceed against Russia. [No. 8; 8th August].

**Roumania and Greece.** The attitude of Roumania at the outbreak of war in July, 1914, was largely contingent on that of Greece. On July 25, 1914, Pašić, the Serbian Premier, asked for an indication of the attitude of Greece in view of the rupture between Austria and Serbia. Venizelos replied that Greece would hold her forces in reserve to oppose Bulgaria if she eventually attacked Serbia,<sup>3</sup> so as to assure respect for the Treaty of Bucarest. "Simultaneously with this, Venizelos got into touch with the Cabinet of Bucarest, and proceeded with them to a joint friendly *démarche* to Bulgaria, in which it was made clear that Roumania would insist upon the maintenance of the Treaty of Bucarest (1913), as indeed they had undertaken to do in a secret annexe to that document."

However, "Germany was at this time already

<sup>2</sup> *La politique étrangère de la Roumanie*, Bucarest, 1891.

<sup>3</sup> Crawford Price, p. 47.

casting around for allies. She was reasonably sure of Turkey, and Bulgaria (according to a declaration made this summer [1916] by the President of the Bulgarian Chamber to the Hungarian paper, the *Pester Lloyd*) was already committed to her. M. Venizelos' warning of July 25 effectually held back Bulgaria, and a suggestion of a new Balkan combination, as a result of which Turkey, Bulgaria, Roumania and Greece were to re-model the map of the Peninsula in their own favour at the expense of Serbia, which was thrown out by Talaat Bey at Bucarest, was also checkmated by the same hand."<sup>4</sup>

Turkey proceeded to war two months after the arrival of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* at Constantinople; the reason of her delay was twofold, firstly, unwillingness to act as the catspaw of Germany, secondly, that the object of this "sale" was ostensibly to enable Turkey to attack Greece and reacquire the islands off the coast of Asia Minor.<sup>5</sup> Grey declared that the Turkish Fleet should not be allowed to sail outside the Dardanelles;<sup>6</sup> and thus this possible war was frustrated, and the Turkish forces were directed against Russia, literally by *force majeure* on the part of the Central Powers.

When the Turkish fleet was led by German commanders against Odessa, and Turkey was thus

<sup>4</sup> Crawford Price, p. 51.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. *Belgian Grey Book*, IV., No. 53, quoted on p. 87.

<sup>6</sup> *Turkish White Paper*, Nos. 55 and 56, 3rd Sept., 1914.



jockeyed into the war,<sup>7</sup> Greece was again anxious to intervene: but made it conditional on obtaining the support either of Bulgaria or Roumania.<sup>8</sup> Roumania refused, because a victory of the Central Powers, or the Entente, would both probably result in an aggrandisement of Bulgaria, as a reward either of intervention on the side of the Central Powers, or as a sop from the Entente for her neutrality.

These considerations to a certain extent supplement the partial story in the Third Austro-Hungarian Red Book, the hesitation of Roumania and Greece were alike ascribable to the diplomatic haze in which Bulgaria was skilfully concealing her real intentions; while the Entente was suing for her favour.

**The first possibility of war: when Turkey joined in.**

§2.—There is a gap in the Austrian papers partly supplemented by the negotiations with Greece: and the despatches attenuate from this point onwards. The entry of Bulgaria and Turkey was being mooted. No. 53 of the Second Belgian Grey Book is very much to the point. The Belgian Minister at Constantinople reports to Davignon that Turkey is on the point of entering the field. "The Ottoman army is much too weak to create any effective diversion against Russia. But Roumania seems to be on the

<sup>7</sup> On the 29th Oct., 1914 [R.O.B., Nos. 90 and 91].

<sup>8</sup> Crawford Price, p. 55.

point of taking a hostile attitude towards Austria, which she could not manage without making sure of the benevolent neutrality of Bulgaria. Possibly Berlin intends putting pressure on Roumania and Bulgaria at the weak point in their armour, viz., their Black Sea Coast, which they could not defend against a bombardment by the Turkish fleet. Yesterday and the day before the Breslau and Goeben did firing practice in the Black Sea."

It was generally expected that Turkey would declare war on Greece to secure the islands on the coast of Asia Minor. [Belgian Grey Book, No. 43; 7th September, 1914].

This despatch lends colour to the Austrian surmise of the 23rd Aug., 1914, that Russia with large promises and grave intimidation (*grösster Terrorismus*) had been working on both Sofia and Bucarest, and making the ministers personally answerable for an anti-Russian policy. [No. 9].

On the 13th September, Czernin reported to Berchtold that the Roumanians were deeply impressed by Russia's advance in Galicia; that Brătianu considered the Austrian position to be critical; that agitation was rife for co-operation with the Entente. [Nos. 10 and 11].<sup>9</sup>

"The cry, 'We want Transylvania,' is the order of the day. Brătianu every day becomes more ambiguous and anxious: the King is the only

<sup>9</sup> Cf. *Times*, 20th Sept., 1914.

brake acting on the downward road." [No. 12; 19th September, 1914].

**Roumania remains neutral. Death of King Charles.** §3.—Turkey was formally ushered into the war by Germany on Nov. 5th, 1914: but the preparations were going on all the time preceding, as is evident from the British and Russian despatches. Roumania, as the controller of the only road to Turkey, was affected: Serbia being, as yet, unconquered.

Brătianu refused leave for the transport of munitions to Turkey: the Roumanians were eager for war against the Monarchy, and any such permission would cause a popular outbreak. Czernin objected that such conduct could hardly be termed "benevolent neutrality," and was scarcely compatible with treaty obligations. [No. 13; 22nd September, 1914].

There is no mention in the preceding documents that Roumania had ever promised a *benevolent*<sup>10</sup> neutrality: merely "strict," "absolute." [v. No. 3 and No. 7]. It was Austria who declared she would still regard Roumania as an ally: in diplomatic language, this would be unilateral, not synallagmatic.

King Charles was ailing, and the Crown Prince accorded Czernin an audience on the 23rd September.

An unwonted personal touch comes into these

<sup>10</sup> Editor's italics.

dry narratives. The Crown Prince is described as irresolute, shifting his point of view, making unreliable statements [No. 14], being evasive, having little authority [No. 42], having little self-confidence or energy [No. 73], as impulsive and weak [No. 80], as using ambiguous language [No. 108].

Evidently, he was not a man of the stern resolution of his uncle, and held different opinions; and this personal factor is of some considerable weight in the subsequent history.

Baron Jéhan de Witte has said that King Charles was the first King of Roumania, but that King Ferdinand will be the first King of the Roumanians.<sup>11</sup>

At the interview of the 23rd Sept., 1914, the Crown Prince declared that "everyone wanted to make war on Roumania," "he did not know what the end would be: only one thing was out of the question, war against Russia." But he considered the popular demand for war against Austria as suicidal: that Roumania would, if Russia won, be Russia's vassal, or if Austria won, Austria's victim. He is also alleged to have said that war against Austria would be a breach of honour and a felony. Czernin regarded the Crown Prince as the passive instrument of his surroundings. [No. 14].

Rumour was busy: on the 28th Sept., 1914,

<sup>11</sup> *Toekomst*, Dec. 16th, 1916.



there was talk of another Crown Council and an invasion of Transylvania. [No. 15].

The King was fast sickening. [No. 16 and 17]. He died on the 10th October. [No. 21]. No Crown Council was held, as the Conservative Marghiloman and the progressive Take Ionescu agreed that "on mature consideration they would support the policy of the Government, and there was no reason for a change." [2nd October, 1914; No. 18].

On the 9th October the crisis was over; and the reservists were disbanded. Czernin suspected that Brătianu was coquetting with the ministers of the Entente but thought the hour was not ripe for intervention.

Czernin thus judges King Charles: "The King, ill and exhausted, had only one thought—rest and an end of this nerve-shattering fight [against the popular demand for intervention in Transylvania]. He would rather die than be guilty of a dastardly act unparalleled in history. And he stood quite alone."

Czernin says that on the 29th Sept., 1914, every preparation had been made to attack Austria. The Crown Council was to decide on an invasion of Transylvania—"an idea, in support of which nearly everybody of authority had been won over, if for different motives." There was open talk of the abdication of King Charles and the enthronement of the Crown Prince.

"Forty-eight hours later the Opposition and the

Government compromised on 'neutrality,' and the disbandment of the reservists."

"The situation is, for the instant, saved." Czernin continues: "We shall remain on top, if our army fulfils our high expectations. But there will be many anxious moments." [No. 20; 9th October, 1914].

What happened in those fateful forty-eight hours is not revealed. Possibly Bulgaria was recalcitrant. The crisis had arisen on the matter of the transit of munitions to Turkey. In the course of it, the pro-German King Charles died. But it may be surmised from similar incidents disclosed in these negotiations that an ultimatum was addressed to Roumania, whose intervention would have been very inopportune to the Central Powers; for it was on the 29th September that the Turco-German fleet started hostilities in the Black Sea by bombarding Odessa.<sup>12</sup>

King Ferdinand on the advice of both Marghiloman and Take Ionescu continued the policy of neutrality.

**The attitude of Greece.** Meantime, in November, the Austrians invaded Serbia for the second time; and the Serbian resistance (as might have been expected) was much feebler. Venizelos again offered to intervene, if Roumania would do so simultaneously; if Bulgaria would remain neutral, and if the Entente would give two

<sup>12</sup> *R.O.B.*, Nos. 90 and 91; *Turkish White Paper*, No. 177.

army corps as a security; the Serbian army being too much reduced.

Roumania refused; "as early as September, 1914, she had declared that she no longer considered the Treaty of Bucarest as a necessary base for regulating the *status quo* in the Balkans"; and she apprehended, that if the Central Empires emerged victorious, their triumph would result in the destruction of Serbia and the enhancement of Bulgaria; but that the Entente would also incline to strengthen Bulgaria, as a reward of intervention on their side, or as a sop for her neutrality.<sup>13</sup>

On 6th March, 1915, King Constantine refused to accept Venizelos' proposal to send Greek troops to the Dardanelles, and Venizelos resigned. The pro-German or neutralist ministries that succeeded him would not in any case move against Austria to succour Serbia. Roumanian intervention would therefore have been a very forlorn hope in the Balkans, unless the intervention of Italy should restore the balance.

**Roumania  
will not let  
munitions  
pass through  
to Turkey.  
The example  
of Italy.**

§4.—The accession of King Ferdinand did not involve any change of policy. Roumania adhered to a rigid neutrality: on the 17th Oct., 1914, absolutely declining to allow the transport of horses or munitions to Turkey [No. 23] and persisting in this determination. [Nos. 24, 27, and 30; *i.e.*, until May, 1915].

<sup>13</sup> Crawford Price, pp. 55 and 56.

She was equally neutral against Germany: on the 16th Nov., 1914, von Waldthausen, the German Minister left Bucarest; the reason is not stated [*Times*]. On or about the 22nd Nov., 1914, a German commercial agency at Bucarest was closed, as suspected of espionage. [*Times*, 22nd Nov., 1914].

The Austrian Red Book is most inconsequential at this point. On the 14th Nov., 1914, Czernin reports there are only two parties: those who do and those who do not deem the time opportune to strike at Austria. The refusal to supply Turkey with arms was very serious; and the only hope lay in military success against the Russians, who held Lwów (Lemberg), Przemyśl, and were advancing from the lines of the San and the Vistula. [No. 24].

Quite significantly, on the 2nd Dec., Czernin anticipates that Roumania will strike in the spring, with the consent of all parties, the Court, to "earn the cheap laurels anew, which she plucked in the last Balkan War." The sole deterrent would be an Austrian success. The King was still ambiguous in his language: but "all the sympathies of Roumania were with France, and passionate hatred against the Central Powers poured forth in every word written or spoken."

At this point there is a gap of three months: and at present one can only surmise what may have been suppressed. Italy was successfully cajoling and bullying Austria into territorial com-



pensations; and it was generally supposed that she and Roumania were acting in concert. Possibly, Austria was also being induced to offer territorial compensations for her breach of the Articles of the Alliance.

Serbia was being spared further invasions, partly through Italian intervention; as Italy had intimated to Austria that a renewed attack without full preliminary consent would be considered a breach of Article VII. of the Triple Alliance; and that even a temporary occupation would bring this Article into force.<sup>14</sup>

On 23rd Jan., 1915, Sir Francis Elliot at Athens once again approached Venizelos, offering concessions in Asia Minor, if only Greece would range herself by her exhausted ally, Serbia. The condition again was the restitution by Greece of some part of Macedonia to Bulgaria, and the intervention of Bulgaria. But Brătianu would not co-operate and King Constantine also would not cede Kavala and Drama; so that the offer to Greece was futile: whilst Roumania clearly distrusted Bulgaria too much to offer her the old frontier of 1913.<sup>15</sup>

The subsequent efforts in April and May to induce the Gounaris ministry to intervene for the Entente were equally fruitless.<sup>16</sup>

The Entente cannot have been idle with respect

<sup>14</sup> A.-H. II, No. 74, 12th Dec., 1914.

<sup>15</sup> Crawford Price, p. 62.

<sup>16</sup> Crawford Price, p. 91.

to Roumania at this period, for on or about 28th Jan., 1915, the British Government advanced Roumania £5,000,000 on account of exchange difficulties with the countries able to supply war materials, so as to put Roumania in a position to face eventualities. [*Times*, 28th Jan., 1915].

Germany was now relieving the pressure on Austria by the attacks on Warsaw, the second of which failed in January, 1915. The Russian advance in the Carpathians had been definitely stayed.

The intentions of Bulgaria were still doubtful, for on the 22nd February, 1915, a Roumano-Bulgarian transit agreement was signed. [*Times*]. Roumania was evidently preparing, for on the 2nd March, 1915, a bill was passed authorising the declaration of a state of siege when ever the Government thought it necessary. [*Times*].

At this point the Austrian despatches cease their curious hibernation: for on the 4th March, 1915, Czernin reports that the Italian Minister at Bucarest is more insistent, and that the King told a politician that "he would follow Italy as an ally, in the event of Italy's attacking Austria." [No. 26].

Italy had just persuaded Berlin to bring Vienna to heel, and make some genuine proposals. [A.-H. II., 109 . . . .].

On the 18th March the King absolutely refused to allow munitions of war to pass to Turkey, and Czernin despaired of success. This despatch [No.

27] leaves the reader in some doubt as to the precise nature of "our wishes" that had been frustrated.

On the 30th March Roumania refused permission to German troops to pass through her territory. [*Times*, 30th March, 1915].

Lwów and Przemyśl had now been taken by the Germans.

There is a further gap in the correspondence. Roumania still refused to pass munitions through her territory, confiscated bags of munitions that were consigned to the German and Austrian legations at Bucarest. [*Times*, 2nd April, 1915].

The approaching break with Italy, and the Austrian victories in Galicia were counterbalancing factors: and both Brătianu and the King wanted to maintain neutrality, but said that Italy's determination made things very critical, and the Opposition—now an interventionist party—might carry the day. Italy might after all accept Austria's offer: so said Czernin. This touch seems to show that Roumania and Italy were acting together. [24th April, and 11th May, 1915; Nos. 28 and 29].

On the point of Turkish munitions Brătianu remained obdurate. [21st May, 1915; No. 30].

On the 23rd May, 1915, when Italy declared war on Austria, Baron Burián (who had replaced Berchtold) played a stronger hand.

He instructed Czernin as follows:—

“ Hesitating to recognise her true interests, enticed by the dazzling offers of the Entente, Roumania has already come into close contact with our enemies. . . . But for Roumania, the question is not what she may get, but what she can keep. Any gains at the cost of the Monarchy would be precarious. Quite apart from subsequent re-acquisition by the Monarchy, a victorious Russia would not suffer a situation in which Roumania, strong and firmly encamped, blocked the way to the Straits, impaired Russian predominance in Bulgaria, and held a decisive position of advantage over the remaining Slav States.

“ Roumania’s permanence depends on the defeat, not on the victory of Russia.

“ We also, after Russia’s crushing defeats, should insist with more emphasis than ever on Roumania’s co-operation with us.” [No. 31].

The King in reply assured Czernin he would do all he could to remain neutral; but “princes could not always do exactly as they liked.” Take Ionescu and Filipescu argued that Berlin and Vienna would never, as things stood, forgive Roumania. Czernin rejoined that Roumania could still win back the good graces of those Courts. [26th May, 1915; No. 32].

The threat had succeeded: the moment for intervention was not propitious. Italy went to war unseconded.



Roumania  
neutral after  
the intervention  
of Italy, and  
prevented from  
intervening when  
Bulgaria took  
up arms.

§5.—Austria had prevailed on Roumania to remain neutral, and still vainly tried to induce her to side with the Central Powers. [9th, 10th and 23rd June, 1915; Nos. 33, 34 and 35]. The Roumanian Army was all but mobilized [*Times*, 17th June, 1915]; the vital question to the Central Powers was the road to Turkey: the road through Serbia was still unassailable.

The parties in Roumania were now four in number: the Liberals, the Conservatives following Marghiloman, the section following Lehovary, and those adhering to Take Ionescu. The third and fourth were both active pro-Entente; the Liberals held their hand; the Conservatives were against the war with Austria. [26th June, 1915; No. 36].

On the 13th July Czernin was still insistent on the question of the Turkish munitions: Brătianu held out no hopes. [No. 37 and 38].<sup>17</sup>

On the 28th August, the King and the Ministry agreed not to put any obstacle in the way of an offensive against Serbia; and so solved the question of transport for Austria. [No. 39].

These very short and spasmodic telegrams throw little light on the real inducements.

The *Times* of the 13th July, 1915, possibly explains the situation, and indicates one whole series of *communiqués* that have been suppressed.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. *Times*, 14th July and 4th Sept., when Roumania seizes and confiscates munitions being clandestinely smuggled into Turkey.

The Central Powers are said to have offered Roumania the Bucovina up to the river Seret, as the northern boundary, so as to comprehend the Roumanian inhabitants, in return for a friendly neutrality.

But, as a reward for prompt military help, Roumania should receive the Bucovina up to the river Pruth, and an extension of territory to the Iron Gates on the Danube, to include the town of Mehadia; on the solemn guarantee of the German Government.

This is probably accurate: it so exactly resembles the offers to Italy; a German guarantee, execution deferred: and no mention of Transylvania. The most essential and vital claim was not Austria's to offer; and Hungary was irreconcilable.

Russia, on the other hand,<sup>18</sup> had promised Bessarabia and Transylvania as an inducement.

However this may be, Austria had scored again: Roumania would again be neutral with regard to Serbia, and the provisionment of Turkey by that route.

**The Bulgarian demand.** §6.—The story of this period (§5) is a reflection of the negotiations passing between all the Great Powers and Bulgaria. The Austrian despatches can be partly supplemented from semi-official statements in the Press. Bulgaria was being munitioned, even from Denmark,<sup>19</sup> and was assiduously wooed

<sup>18</sup> *Times*, 13th July, 1915.

<sup>19</sup> *Politiken*, 2. vj. 15.

by the Quadruple Entente. She was promised Serbian Macedonia, Greek Macedonia (as far as Kavala), and the Enos-Midia frontier as against Turkey. She asked for more: and wanted to know what compensation would be adjudged to Serbia and Greece, and what she was to gain in the Dobrudja.<sup>20</sup> It was claimed at Sofia that Bulgaria ought to be restored to the frontiers settled at the Conference of London, 1913: and on these conditions she would oppose not Russia, but Pan-Germanism.<sup>21</sup>

Such rectifications would have been hard enough to enforce by the "Concert of the Powers": it was very much complicated by the fact of the Great European War, and the influence on the little Powers of the Balkans of the ebb and flow of fortune in the field: for Russia was beginning her great and disastrous retreat. There were rumours that negotiations were proceeding for a separate peace with Russia.<sup>22</sup>

**The offers of the Entente.** On the 30th June the Quadruple Entente sent in its offer to Bulgaria;<sup>23</sup> but these were apparently unacceptable, for Ghenadiev claimed the whole of the Dobrudja, as well as Macedonia.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>20</sup> *Berliner Morgenpost*, 22. vj. 15.

<sup>21</sup> *Echo de Bulgarie*, 23. vj. 15; *Mir*, 23. vj. 15; cf. *Berliner Tageblatt*, 2. vij. 15; *Pesti Hírlap*, 12. vij. 15.

<sup>22</sup> *La corrispondenza militare*, 13. vij. 15.

<sup>23</sup> *Stampa*, 30. vj. 15.

<sup>24</sup> *Pesti Hírlap*, 12. vij. 15.

In the meantime the Quadruple Entente was trying to make Roumania, Greece and Serbia consent to these sacrifices: Roumania required the Roumanian territories in the Banat of Temesvár, Bucovina and Transylvania. Russia objected to giving up Northern Bucovina, and the Western Banat, as not being Roumania in population (not to speak of cessions in Bessarabia, of which there is no mention until late in 1916);<sup>25</sup> Roumania insisted on the possession of Czernowitz and the boundary of the Pruth.<sup>26</sup> The negotiations came to a standstill.<sup>27</sup> But, after the fall of Lemberg, Russia was willing to concede Czernowitz and the line of the Pruth;<sup>28</sup> and promised that the Dardanelles should be internationalized.<sup>29</sup>

**Offers of the Central Powers.** The Central Powers, too, up to this point had not been idle. They offered Roumania a rectification of the Transylvania frontier and in Bucovina, and a grant of autonomy to the remainder of Transylvania.<sup>30</sup> This much was offered in return for neutrality: for active participation, Bessarabia, Bucovina up to the Pruth, and extension up the Danube to Mehadia.<sup>31</sup> Evidently these overtures did not succeed: for Roumania was pronounced to

<sup>25</sup> *Corriere delle Sera*, 10. vj. 15.

<sup>26</sup> *Nóvoye Vremya*, 18. vj. 15.

<sup>27</sup> *Rěč*, 6. vij. 15; *Corriere della Sera*, 9. vij. 15.

<sup>28</sup> *Züricher Post*, 15. vij. 15.

<sup>29</sup> *Nieuwe Rott. Ct.*, 17. vij. 15.

<sup>30</sup> *Tribuna*, 27. vj. 15 (Report from Sofia).

<sup>31</sup> *Times*, 13. vij. 15.



be anti-neutral, in stopping munitions to Turkey;<sup>32</sup> the Central Powers would have to consider whether their Treaty to Roumania bound them any longer.<sup>33</sup> They began terrorizing. "Whenever the Germans have a victory over the enemy, they at once begin to threaten us. We can imagine what will happen if Germany is victorious."<sup>34</sup> They exercised economic pressure on Roumania, reducing her State revenue by 36,608,306 francs;<sup>35</sup> they concentrated at least 160,000 troops on the Hungarian frontier.<sup>36</sup>

As a result, Roumania had to relax her inhibition on the transit of war material and men to Turkey;<sup>37</sup> the interventionist party, *Acțiunea Națională*, was defeated;<sup>38</sup> and these endearments from the Central Powers induced renewed relations with the Quadruple Alliance, under pressure of the contingencies in Bulgaria and Greece.

**The Central Powers and Bulgaria, up to August, 1915.** Radoslavov, the Bulgarian minister, was said to be pro-German;<sup>39</sup> the Roumano-Bulgarian agreement as to transit of goods was said to be illusory.<sup>39</sup> The Bulgarian attitude was undecided

<sup>32</sup> *Deutsche Tages Ztg*, 12. vij. 15.

<sup>33</sup> *Frankfurter Ztg*, 12. vij. 15.

<sup>34</sup> *Adevărul*, 18. vij. 15.

<sup>35</sup> *Tägliche Rundschau*, 26. vij. 15; *La Politique* (Roum.), 25. vij. 15.

<sup>36</sup> *Adevărul*, 27. vij. 15.

<sup>37</sup> *Moskov. Věd.*, 22. vij., 15; *Adevărul*, 13. viij. 15.

<sup>38</sup> *La Politique*, 28. vij. 15.

<sup>39</sup> *Berliner Tageblatt*, 2. vij. 15.

even at the end of July; they feared that the arms of the Entente might solve the Turkish question without calling in Bulgaria, and that Germany could not advance a loan;<sup>40</sup> but this last doubt was dissipated, for Germany issued Bulgarian Treasury Bills early in August to the extent of 120 million francs at 7%.<sup>41</sup> The offer of the Entente was too shadowy; neither Greece nor Serbia evacuated their portions of Macedonia;<sup>42</sup> and Bulgaria pledged herself to a benevolent neutrality towards Turkey.<sup>43</sup>

Hence Roumania was left as the one obstacle in the munitionment of Turkey: and the Central Powers had reconciled Turkey and Bulgaria.

**The Central Powers and Greece. Greece and Bulgaria reconciled.**

The Quadruple Entente was anxious to propitiate Bulgaria, who held the keys of Constantinople; and to effect this, had to induce Roumania, Serbia and Greece to renounce their gains in the Second Balkan War, 1913.

Greece was dubious as to her advantage in joining the Allies: what would she benefit, if Constantinople fell (the Dardanelles expedition had not collapsed in July, 1915); what compensations would Bulgaria receive; what would happen if Bulgaria were obdurate, or attacked Macedonia

<sup>40</sup> *Echo de Bulgarie*, 30. vij. 15.

<sup>41</sup> *Köln. Ztg.*, 3. viij. 15.

<sup>42</sup> *Journal de Genève*, 2. viij., 15.

<sup>43</sup> *Le Temps*, 2. viij., 15; *Kreuzztg.*, 16. viij. 15.

for herself?<sup>44</sup> This attitude evidently pleased the Kaiser, for he telegraphed to Queen Sofia of Greece: "Thanks to you and to Bulgaria and Roumania, our triumph is assured."<sup>45</sup> Greece would not consent to cede Kavala to Bulgaria,<sup>46</sup> though Great Britain had offered Cyprus as a sop, to induce Greece to keep her Treaty-bond.<sup>47</sup>

The Kaiser's language was not mere bombast. For, on the 17th July, a treaty had been signed between Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria, under which Bulgaria was to receive the whole of Albania, Greek and Serbian Macedonia (thus including Salonica and Kavala). This was only published on the 11th October: and was vouched for by the British Minister at Athens.<sup>48</sup>

The arrangement was consummated in October, 1915, when the Bulgarian railways were placed at the disposal of Germany: Bulgaria promised to attack Serbia: Germany was to invade Serbia from the North with 300,000 men; and Bulgaria was to receive Bulgarian and Serbian Macedonia, and was free to settle accounts with Greece.<sup>49</sup>

The beginning of August seems to have found Bulgaria definitely inclining towards Germany; but

<sup>44</sup> *Neue Freie Presse*, 17. vij. 15.

<sup>45</sup> *Journal des Balkans*, 18. vij. 15.

<sup>46</sup> *Nóvoye Vremya*, 29. vij. 15; *Messenger d'Athènes*, 10. viij. 15.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. *Times*, 27. x. 15.

<sup>48</sup> *Times*, 17. vii. 15; 11. x. '15; 8. x. '15; Πατρίς, 'Εστία, 10. x. 15.

<sup>49</sup> *Echo de Paris*, 7. x. 15, quoting Kambana.

the former still demanded Kavala and the hinterland.<sup>50</sup>

But Germany still had one task left over; the reconciliation of Greece and Bulgaria was now attempted by the Central Powers;<sup>51</sup> and was consummated by a treaty in November, 1915.

The provisions are stated to have been:—

1. A benevolent neutrality from Greece to Bulgaria.

2. The Bulgarian forces to be guarded by Greece from any sudden attack.

3. The Expeditionary Force at Salonica to be regarded as uninvited guests.

4. The Treaty of Alliance between Greece and Serbia to be considered null and void.

5. Bulgaria renounced her pretensions to Greek Macedonia, and would aid Greece to extend her frontiers (*i.e.*, against Italy) in Albania.

This treaty was signed by King Ferdinand of Bulgaria, King Constantine of Greece, Radoslavov for Bulgaria, and Zaimis on behalf of Greece.<sup>52</sup>

How this treaty could be reconciled with that of the 17th July (first disclosed on the 11th Oct.) may be left to the ingenuity of the Germans who promoted both.

**The Quadruple  
Entente and  
Serbia.**

The Quadruple Entente, if it was to placate Bulgaria, also had to exact from Serbia, its own ally, a return

<sup>50</sup> *La Tribuna*, 8. viij. 15.

<sup>51</sup> *Berliner Tageblatt*, 25. viij. 15.

<sup>52</sup> *Adevărul*, 19. xj. 15.



to the conditions all-but ratified at the Conference of London, 1913.

Austria-Hungary in August, 1915, was very much exhausted,<sup>53</sup> and seems to have been anxious to conclude a separate peace with Serbia. Serbia had compromised with Italy on her claims to Dalmatia and raised no objection to the Italians having the coast-line.<sup>54</sup>

By the end of August, 1915, the Quadruple Entente had induced Serbia to yield up her share of Bulgarian Macedonia, and part of her claim to the Banat of Temesvár; thus reconciling both Bulgaria and Roumania.

Bulgaria demanded in addition as her price, Rodosto (on the Sea of Marmora), Kavala, and the Dobrudja.<sup>55</sup> Bulgaria also required to know what compensation Serbia was to receive.<sup>56</sup>

"It has taken a year for the Entente to decide to give Bulgaria what she asked, and the latter now waits to know Serbia's answer."<sup>57</sup>

Clearly the Entente were not able to give Bulgaria her frontier as settled by the abortive Conference of London: it might have been equally clear that Bulgaria was playing for time into the hands of Germany.

The Entente also vetoed any attack by Serbia

<sup>53</sup> *Adéverul*, 6. viij. 15.

<sup>54</sup> Interview with Pašić; *Corriere della Sera*, 23. viij. 15.

<sup>55</sup> *Le Matin*, 29. viii. 15.

<sup>56</sup> *La Tribuna*, 8. viii. 15.

<sup>57</sup> *Journal de Genève*, 11. ix. 15; *Journal des Débats*, 17. ix. 15

on Bulgaria, in anticipation of Bulgaria's joining the Central Empires;<sup>58</sup> in which the latter had her proper place, rather than in a Balkan League.<sup>58</sup> Delcassé resigned his portfolio as Foreign Minister of France, probably in disapproval of this decision.

Yet in the middle of September Bulgaria, who was, like all the Balkan States, merely pursuing her own interests, was sounded by the Entente whether she would attack Turkey and accept the Serbian concessions:<sup>59</sup> this action was represented by the Austrians as a cringing of the Entente and the Tsar before Bulgaria.<sup>60</sup>

**The Entente and Roumania.** The attitude assumed by Roumania during these negotiations was necessarily very cautious.

By the 6th August, 1915, apparently matters had been accommodated between the Entente and Roumania, who would not join Germany under any condition, and might join in a new Russian offensive (which did not eventuate).<sup>61</sup> This rumour of a treaty between Roumania and the Entente was also officially contradicted.<sup>62</sup> But any such intervention must be on the rising tide; they could not aid the Russians in retreat: "It is in the interest of the Allies that Roumania's inter-

<sup>58</sup> *Köln. Ztg.*, 3. xj. 15.

<sup>59</sup> *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten*, 17. ix. 15.

<sup>60</sup> *Neue Freie Presse*, 26. ix. 15.

<sup>61</sup> *Adevărul*, 6. viij. 15; *Le Matin*, 29. viij. 15.

<sup>62</sup> *Berlingske Tidende*, 6. viij. 15.

vention should be the *coup de grâce*.”<sup>63</sup> “ Her army may cross the Carpathians [*i.e.*, in the event of participation] without anxiety: the Balkan Alliance assures her safety on the Danube.”<sup>64</sup>

Germany was dissatisfied with the continued prohibition of the transit of munitions to Turkey, though submarines in sections were allowed through.<sup>65</sup>

But by the 23rd August some pressure must have been put upon Roumania, who, it was said, would be benevolently neutral, and would not attack Bulgaria;<sup>66</sup> and on the 31st a declaration of war on Roumania by the Central Powers was said to be imminent;<sup>67</sup> this rumour was, however, denied.<sup>68</sup>

If such a course had been threatened, it would explain Roumania's passivity towards the projected invasion of Serbia. [A.-H., III.; 28th August].

At all events, Russia's offers were insufficient. She had secured the neutrality of Roumania, nothing more. The crucial point was Bessarabia; and Roumania put no trust in the Russian promise;<sup>69</sup> and had to recognise the claims of Bulgaria, and do nothing to counter them.<sup>70</sup>

<sup>63</sup> *Adevărul*, 8. viij. 15.

<sup>64</sup> *Adevărul*, 15. viij. 15.

<sup>65</sup> *Frankfurterztg*, 14. viij. 15; *Aachener Allgemeine Ztg*, 23. viij. 15.

<sup>66</sup> *Aachener Allgemeine Ztg*, 23. viij. 15.

<sup>67</sup> *Tribune de Genève*, 31. viij. 15.

<sup>68</sup> *Neue Zürcher Ztg*, 1. ix. 15 (quoting *Viitorul*).

<sup>69</sup> *Münch. Neueste Nach*, 16. ix. 15.

<sup>70</sup> *Trierscheztg*, 17. ix. 15.

On the 24th Sept., 1915, Czernin delivered a virtual ultimatum. [A.-H., III., No. 46]. Feeling may have been kindled in Roumania by the arbitrary conduct and barbarity of the Austro-Hungarian authorities in Transylvania.<sup>71</sup>

Moreover, the Germans were boycotting Roumanian trade, and causing great loss.<sup>72</sup>

The Roumanian Press was being bribed and corrupted by both Russia and Germany: the latter founded a new *League of the People* [Liga Populară] to forward their interests.<sup>73</sup>

It had often been rumoured that Roumania and the Quadruple Entente had entered into a definite compact. The text of the agreement was published in Russia in October, 1915. The stipulations were:—

The Quadruple Entente undertook to cede a portion of Bucovina, of 14,000 square kilometres [probably this was a fair division], and not to conclude peace, until Roumania had been able to annex Transylvania, Bucovina, and a part of the Banat [thus giving effect to the compact with Serbia].

Roumania was to put 500,000 men into the field, and not to make a separate peace with Austria-Hungary without the consent of the Entente.

Should Bulgaria join the Entente, Roumania should return the strip of the Dobrudja annexed

<sup>71</sup> *Echo de Paris*, 10. x. 15; *Adevărul*, 19. xj. 15.

<sup>72</sup> *Deutscher Aussenhandel*, 20. ix. 15.

<sup>73</sup> *La Roumanie*, 24. ix. 15; *Kreuzztg.*, 11. xij. 15.



at the conclusion of the Second Balkan War [*i.e.*, the quadrilateral of Silistria—Tuturkai—Balčik—Mangalia].

Roumania should observe a benevolent neutrality until she intervenes.

Should Bulgaria join the Central Powers, Roumania should send 250,000 troops to aid the Serbs.<sup>74</sup>

It will be observed that the attitude of Bulgaria, and her engagements, were still unknown; that it was assumed that Russia would guard the Danube frontier, or else that Bulgaria would not declare war against Roumania; and that the main effort of Roumania was to be directed against Transylvania—a very distant road to cutting the backbone of Central Europe (*viz.*, the Continental route to Turkey, through Pest, Belgrade and Niš); lastly, there is still no mention of Bessarabia.

These preparations (in conjunction with the unreadiness of the Allies at Salonica) furnish a further reason and justification of the ultimatum delivered by Austria on the 24th Sept. [A.H., 45]; as also of the fact that munitions were for a time allowed to pass through to Turkey;<sup>75</sup> and smuggling of them was very common;<sup>76</sup> also that German agents were buying petrol at Galați in very large quantities.<sup>77</sup>

<sup>74</sup> *Russkoye Slóvo*, 5. x. 15; *Neue Freie Presse*, 5. x. 15.

<sup>75</sup> *Echo de Paris* quoting *Dimineața*, 5. x. 15.

<sup>76</sup> *Journal des Débats*, 7. x. 15; *Ἑμπρός* 25. x. '15.

<sup>77</sup> *Adevărul*, 9. x. 15; *La Politique*, 25. ii. 16.

On this important matter of petrol some figures may be useful.<sup>78</sup>

### EXPORTS FROM ROUMANIA.<sup>79</sup>

	1914.	1915.
To Germany ... ..	99,165 ...	154,688
„ Austria-Hungary	84,253 ...	225,699
„ Bulgaria ... ..	18,689 ...	33,568
„ France ... ..	50,028 ...	—
„ Great Britain ...	77,971 ...	—
„ Russia ... ..	7,016 ...	578
„ Turkey ... ..	31,463 ...	8,191
„ other countries...	285,439 ...	6,363
Total	654,024	429,087
Or in percentages:—		
	1914.	1915.
To Germany and		
Austria ... ..	28.04% ...	88.64%
„ France and Gt.		
Britain ... ..	19.57% ...	—
„ Russia ... ..	1.07% ...	0.13%
„ Bulgaria ... ..	2.86% ...	7.83%
„ Turkey ... ..	4.81% ...	1.92%
„ other countries	43.65% ...	1.48%

On the 8th and 9th Oct., 1915, Bulgaria, before going to war, published a long memorandum explaining her motives for adhesion to the Central Powers.<sup>80</sup>

<sup>78</sup> *Universul*, 4. iv. 16.

<sup>79</sup> For the figures as to grain, *v.* pp. 111 and 112.

<sup>80</sup> *Frankfurterztg.* 8 and 9. x. 15.

A typical piece of German propaganda at this time deserves mention: it was intended to arouse distrust in Russia, and is absolutely unsubstantiated, viz.: that Great Britain and Russia had made a secret treaty against Roumania and Bulgaria, by which Russia was to acquire Constanța, Constantinople and Burgas.<sup>81</sup> The truth at the bottom of this may be that German agents tried to detach Russia from the Entente with the bribe of Constanța, just as in 1916 they were endeavouring to seduce Russia to a separate peace with an offer of the whole of Moldavia.<sup>82</sup>

The anti-interventionists at Bucarest were naturally encouraged by the course of events, and a demonstration was made towards the end of October, 1915, to overthrow the Brătianu Cabinet:<sup>83</sup> followed by a great anti-German demonstration, at which Take Ionescu and Filipescu spoke.<sup>84</sup>

There were insistent rumours for some time following these last events of a German incendiary

<sup>81</sup> *Köln. Volksztg.*, 24. x. 15.

<sup>82</sup> *Literary Digest*, 9. vij. '16; *Sunday Telegram*, 17. vij. '16; and cf. *Le Genevois* (quoted by the *Gazzetta Ticinese*, 17. iii. 17) and *Berner Tagwacht*, 6. x. 16: stating that Roumania was to be offered by the Central Powers to Russia in part, together with Armenia and parts of Galicia, in return for a separate peace and a free hand elsewhere.

<sup>83</sup> *Journal de Genève*, 27. x. 15 (quoting *Wiener Correspondenz*).

<sup>84</sup> *Münch. Neueste Nachrichten*, 28. x. 15.

plot against Filipescu, Take Ionescu, Brătianu, and Costinescu.<sup>85</sup>

This intermediate chapter will supply some of the missing links in the official story as put forward by the Austro-Hungarian Government.

**Roumania  
is quiescent  
when Bulgaria  
enters the  
field.**

§7.--But Serbia could not be crushed without the aid of Bulgaria.

Dr. Dillon, in *Land and Water*, of 9th October, 1916, says of the negotiations of the Allies: "Four great powers entered into conversation with the four or five Balkan States, so that nine foreign secretaries and about sixty ministers plenipotentiary were thereupon engaged in interchanging views. . . . Months passed in this elaborate effort to get Bulgaria to outline her demands, and to move Serbia to accord them. And all that expenditure of time and labour was made in the single-minded belief that Bulgaria's statement was true, and that her freedom of choice (which it presupposed) really existed. . . . Serbia, heroic in her voluntary sacrifice, as in her terrible martyrdom, accepted the situation and gave up Macedonia. [Be it observed, Serbia alone of the Balkan Kingdoms has a national dynasty, not a German prince]. Bulgaria could no longer lurk and weave unavowed plans in the safe retreat of justifiable neutrality. . . . Mobilization was resorted to, when the game of neutrality could be

<sup>85</sup> *Deutsche Tagesztg.*, 13. xij. 15; *La Stampa* (quoting *Wiener Allg. Ztg.*), 19. xij. 15.



prolonged no further. . . . The first care of Sofia and Berlin was to tranquillize Roumania and Greece. The game was being played by two partners. Germany had already spread far and wide the terrifying tale that she was about to hack her way through Serbia, and to pass thence through Bulgaria into Turkey. The attitude of the brave Bulgars would then be shaped by dire necessity. . . .

“Four Bulgarian divisions were despatched to keep watch and ward over Roumania. . . .

“As soon as 25,000 Bulgarian Comitadjis overran Macedonia, Serbian troops would have to be despatched from the North-Eastern front, leaving Germany’s road to Turkey inadequately defended. . . .”

These preliminary quotations explain the fragmentary despatches in this section: Roumania was on her guard, too, against Austria, for there were 200,000 German troops concentrated at Brassó on the Roumanian frontier [*Times*, 30th Aug., 1915]. They could be moved either into Roumania, or North-Eastern Serbia by Orşova.

On the 10th Sept., Brătianu and Czernin had a “very earnest conversation.” Austria had closed the Hungaro-Roumanian frontier to all intercourse and traffic whatsoever; Roumania had had to protect herself. Brătianu asseverated once again he had no treaty with the Entente; but Roumanians were expecting an attack from Austria—a probability he himself discounted. Czernin adds in his

own despatch: "I repeat I am convinced that no attack from Roumania need be anticipated in our present military situation." [No. 40 and 41].

Not content with the answer given by Brătianu, Czernin had an interview with the King on the 14th Sept. Czernin demanded the withdrawal of the Roumanian troops (which were all-but mobilized, *v. Times*, 7th, 15th and 29th Sept.); and, apparently, there was some dispute between the King and General Iliescu and Brătianu. The King shilly-shallied—according to Czernin, who insisted that the King as *oberster Kriegsherr* had only to command. [The Austrians in all their negotiations with Italy, Serbia, etc., never understand a constitutional monarchy].

At last the King promised to withdraw his troops at once if the Austrians opened the frontier and withdrew theirs. The frontier was opened on the same day. [No. 42].

Brătianu (whom Czernin interviewed next day) consented to withdraw the troops in a fortnight, after the defensive works had been constructed. "He would be a lunatic to attack the Monarchy now, when he refused, whilst the Russians were beyond the Carpathians." [No. 43].

On the 22nd the troops were still on the frontier. Czernin took it on himself to inform the King that his orders were disobeyed. [No. 44].

On the 24th September Czernin acted summarily, and told Brătianu "he had no orders, and was not speaking officially. But, as a private individual

acquainted with Berlin and Vienna, he must notify him that Roumania was not in the position of Greece [which was then governed by Venizelos and bound by alliance to Serbia]; and a mobilization would force the Monarchy to ask for explanations. He had better weigh the consequences."

Brătianu bridled at the distinction made between Roumania and all the other Balkan States that had mobilized. Czernin pointed to the hostility of the Roumanian press.

On that day, the 24th Sept., a Cabinet Council was on the point of meeting [No. 45]: and was satisfactorily intimidated. [No. 46].

Burián approved this brusque action [No. 47] and Roumania was effectively deterred from any further military measures. [No. 46; 24th Sept.].

Burián remarked [No. 47]: "To-day, when even Bulgaria has shaken herself free of the terror of the Moscovites, Roumania ought to be able to pick up pluck enough to resume the road to which history, the true interests of the country and prudence all point."

Again Austria had scored. Bulgaria entered the war, and Roumania was mute and neutral. The time was not ripe for action: Brătianu could not publish his reasons.<sup>86</sup> Serbia was crushed and the road to Constantinople clear.

As a mere incident one other fact might be mentioned at this stage.

<sup>86</sup> *Le Temps*, 2. x. 15 (in reply to a parliamentary delegation).

In the beginning of 1915, when the Bulgarians had renounced the Balkan League, and found harbour with the Central Powers,<sup>87</sup> the official pundits discovered a new racial affinity between the Magyars, Bulgarians and Turks; and Pan-Turanianism came into fashion, to the discarding of Panslavism, which, anyhow, had incited Russia to create Bulgaria in 1878 *ex nihilo*.

**The period before the final act.** §8.—The Roumanian people were none the less pro-Ally, because their government was still forced to passivity.

On or about the 5th Oct., there was a popular demand for full mobilization, and the Bulgarian ports on the Danube were closed to Roumanian traffic [*Times*, 5th Oct., 1915]; on the 7th troops were sent to the Bulgarian frontier and Giurgievo was fortified. There must have been danger of treachery and espionage, for officers of Bulgarian origin were sent into the interior of the country: and the army was kept on a strong war-footing [*ibid.*, 7th Oct. and 18th Oct., 1915]. On the 18th it was reported that the army of 600,000 could be increased to 1,100,000, but for lack of munitions: 220,000 were concentrated in the Carpathians [*ibid.*, 22nd Oct., 1915].

On the 3rd Nov. Burián was apprehensive of a Russian violation of Roumania, with her connivance: both Czernin and Brătianu dissipated the notion. [Nos. 48 and 49].

<sup>87</sup> Thus Radoslavov in *Köln. Ztg.*, 3. xj. 15; *Iasul*, 2. iij. 16; *Universul*, 15. iij. 15.



There is another prodigious gap in this series of documents, over the winter. In the meantime Serbia was overrun, Riga was attacked, and all but abandoned, the Allied forces driven back to their position before the offensive of 1915 which culminated in the capture of Monastir; the Dardanelles were evacuated; the British advance on Kut proved disastrous; it was only the Russian advance in Armenia, and the German defeat at Verdun that redeemed the situation.

What negotiations were pending between Roumania and the Great Powers can at present only be guessed.

**The sale of Roumanian cereals during the critical period of 1915.**

One other great issue for Roumania was the sale of her cereal harvests: it furnished a large part of the national income, and all the belligerents were in need of her supplies, which were too large for home consumption.

The economic progress made by Roumania has been mentioned elsewhere (p. 19).

On English reports, it appears that on the 22nd Jan., 1916, Great Britain purchased £10,000,000 of Roumanian wheat [*Times*, 22nd and 31st Jan., and 16th Feb., 1916]. But, by way of compensation, Roumania had to supply the Austro-German Empires with 1,000,000 tons of maize, 150,000 tons of barley and 100,000 tons of oats [*Times*, 4th Feb., 1916]. And on the 14th February the Central Empires entered a protest against

the purchase by Great Britain, though Germany had already bought 200,000 tons, but had not been able to fetch it for lack of trucks [*ibid.*, 14th Feb., 1916].

In January, 1916, the export of grain was forbidden (which marks a change of policy from November, 1915); and this caused Roumania financial loss and deprivation in Germany.<sup>88</sup>

But in that same month 600,000 truck-loads were ordered for Great Britain;<sup>89</sup> and 80,000 waggons of corn for Germany.<sup>90</sup> One note must be made regarding this last purchase (as it bears on military possibilities); Roumania had not sufficient trucks to convey this quantity.<sup>91</sup>

In exchange Germany would send anything, save war materials though Roumania had passed cotton through to Turkey.<sup>92</sup>

Yet the pro-German party represented that after the contract with Great Britain, "the Government had lost all right to pose as neutral."<sup>93</sup>

The matter was compromised and both sets of belligerents were to get their deliveries on the 1st June.<sup>94</sup>

The Central Powers were evidently putting

<sup>88</sup> *Indépendance Roumaine*, 13. xj. 15; *Vorwärts*, 5. i. 16.

<sup>89</sup> *Köln. Ztg.*, 15. i. 16.

<sup>90</sup> *La Politique*, 22. i. 16.

<sup>91</sup> *La Politique*, 2. ii. 16.

<sup>92</sup> *Universul*, 14. ii. 16; 3. ii. 16.

<sup>93</sup> *Steagul*, 14. ii. 16.

<sup>94</sup> *Adevărul*, 13. ii. 16; *La Politique*, 10. iii. 16; *Adevărul* 11. iii 16.

economic pressure on to Roumania; thus they granted leave for the import of Roumanian wine in April, 1916.<sup>95</sup>

In 1916 Roumania—having no other market—had been compelled to sell to the Central Powers: from Jan. 1st—May 14th, 548,236,790 kilos of cereals;

April 1st—May 14th, 230,926,879 kilos of grain.<sup>96</sup>

These figures merely demonstrate what were the disabilities of Roumania as a neutral. She had no market, save the Powers hostile to her, and was subject to constant economic pressure and military demonstrations.

Also, in this unchronicled interval, the Roumanians had not been neglecting military precautions. They succeeded in leaving both sets of belligerents in doubt as to their choice.<sup>97</sup> By the 7th Feb., 1916, the special army credits amounted to £24,000,000, reservists abroad were summoned home: the Roumanian Bank collected a large gold reserve: the new '17 and '18 classes would bring the effective strength of the army up to 1,000,000. On the 15th Feb. the mobilization is stated to be completed; the Carpathian passes and the banks of the Danube in the new Dobrudja territory were being fortified [*Times*, 7th, 10th, 12th and 15th Feb., 1916].

<sup>95</sup> *Pesti Hírlap*, 28. iv. 16.

<sup>96</sup> *Universul*, 7. vj. 16.

<sup>97</sup> *Berliner Tageblatt*, 29. i. 16.

Roumania's  
relations with  
Germany and  
Russia.

Although the road to Constantinople was now open to the Central Powers, they still were trying to avail themselves of the Roumanian railways, and shells for Turkey were despatched, to take only one of many instances, concealed in large crates of sugar.

Whether there were any haggings proceeding in the form of the offer of territories by way of compensation or enticement from the belligerents, there is no record to hand: but it is, at the least, probable.

If only Russia would make concessions in Bessarabia, late as the offer was, she might win Roumania over.<sup>98</sup> Filipescu in February apparently went to Petrograd,<sup>99</sup> and returned a month later, with very little practical result.<sup>100</sup> The negotiations as to cessions in Bessarabia failed.<sup>101</sup> It was considered that Briand's visit to Rome foreshadowed renewed pressure on Roumania.<sup>102</sup>

Very probably a German ultimatum was launched at Roumania, requiring her to demobilize. She refused, because Bulgaria had been aggrandised, and she hereby might enter into the war by the end of March.<sup>103</sup> Brătianu was pledged to the Entente;

<sup>98</sup> *Journal de Genève*, 2. ii. 16.

<sup>99</sup> *Vossische Ztg.*, 23. ii. 16.

<sup>100</sup> *Weserztg.*, 16. iii. 16.

<sup>101</sup> *Limburger Koerier* quoting *Minerva*, 26. ii. 16.

<sup>102</sup> *Köln. Volksztg.*, 12. ii. 16.

<sup>103</sup> 'Εσπρίνη 25. ii. 16; Νέα Ελλάς 5. iii. 16.



and the British Embassy at Petrograd was striving to effect a Greco-Roumanian accord.<sup>104</sup>

At the same time Brătianu and Radoslavov had been discussing economic arrangements.<sup>105</sup>

A grand move was expected from Russia over the Bessarabian frontier,<sup>106</sup> but Skoloudis (the Greek Premier) declared for neutrality.<sup>107</sup>

Possibly the Dual Monarchy might make a bid for Roumanian neutrality, as she did last year [v. p. 97]: but the utmost concession Tisza would offer in Transylvania was the teaching of Roumanian by Magyars in the elementary schools.<sup>108</sup>

Meantime, Germany had been trying to mobilize even the "activists," or pro-Germans, of Sweden to influence the government of Roumania.<sup>109</sup>

In March, 1916, the Red Book at last breaks silence. On the 7th March<sup>110</sup> Burián requests the same defensive neutrality on the Russian as on the other frontiers. [No. 50]. Czernin had an interview of the King (10th March), who considered that there was no danger of a Russian invasion.

<sup>104</sup> *Steagul, Adeverul, Iasul*, 2. ii. 16.

<sup>105</sup> *Berliner Tageblatt*, 17. ii. 16 (quoting *Nóvoye Vremya*).

<sup>106</sup> *Deutsche Tagesztg*, 3. iii. 16.

<sup>107</sup> *Nέα Ἑλλάς*, 5. ii. 16.

<sup>108</sup> *Adeverul*, 7. iii. 16.

<sup>109</sup> *Deutsche Tagesztg*, 13. xij. 15; *Berliner Tageblatt*, 15. iij. 16.

<sup>110</sup> The same point had been reaffirmed on the 1st January, that Roumania would not give passage to the Russians. [*Deutsche Tagesztg*, 1. i. 16].

As a fact troops were heavily concentrated on the Austro-Hungarian frontier, which was closed; and there was no Russian army on the Eastern frontier.<sup>111</sup>

Czernin also interviewed Porumbaru, the Foreign Minister by himself. Porumbaru objected that Roumania could not be held responsible if the Russian troops "made a surprise move, without the assent of the Roumanian Government"; to which Czernin rejoined that, after this third warning, Roumania would be held accountable for all the consequences.

The danger, in Czernin's opinion, lay in Brătianu's apathy and bad will. [No. 51].

From all these signs, war with Austria was anticipated at the end of March; what postponed it is not clear. Probably Russia was too weak and too grudging. The press was urging that Roumania ought to strike on the Danube at the Bulgars, before attempting an invasion of Transylvania (where confessedly the Russians had *not* massed troops);<sup>112</sup> when the moment was favourable. Marghiloman, the Conservative, was now in agreement with Brătianu;<sup>113</sup> and the anti-Russian party is told that, if only Roumania were a nation of 13 millions and had the Bucovina, Banat and Transylvania and Bessarabia, she would be a power to respect.<sup>114</sup>

<sup>111</sup> *Adevărul*, 14. iiij. 16; *Indépendance Roumaine*, 15. iiij. 16.

<sup>112</sup> *Adevărul*, 23. iiij. 16; *Universul*, 24. iiij. 16.

<sup>113</sup> *Steagul*, 13. iiij. 16; *Preporets* (Bulgarian paper), 14. iv. 16.

<sup>114</sup> *Universul*, 26. iv. 16.

There was a certain amount of impatience, for, on the 12th May, it is said that Roumania cannot wait indefinitely on Russia, before she decides on invading Transylvania; the prolongation of her neutrality spells territorial loss.

The Allies at Salonica (where there were 400,000<sup>115</sup> troops to match the 350,000 Bulgarians) can keep the Bulgarians busy; Roumania need only concern herself with the Carpathians:<sup>116</sup> whilst any agreement with the Central Powers is merely commercial.<sup>117</sup>

About this time, too, Carp, Maiorescu, and other pro-Germans proceeded to Austria; and Austria solemnly deprived Take Ionescu of the insignia of the Iron Crown.<sup>118</sup>

These comments may explain why the Austrian Red Book resumes its despatches: why on the 12th May Brătianu is said to have spontaneously expressed the opinion that neither combatant had won; that Roumania had better bide her time. [Nos. 52 and 53].

Czernin gave Brătianu to understand that "a draw was as impossible as a defeat of Austria, and there would be no chance given to Roumania for co-operation after an Austrian victory." [Nos. 52 and 53].

<sup>115</sup> Cf. *Echo*, 28. ix. 16, quoting interview with Radev in *Voss. Ztg.*

<sup>116</sup> *Adevărul*, 12. v. 16.

<sup>117</sup> *Birževyya Vėd.*, 12. v. 16; *La Roumanie*, 14. v. 16.

<sup>118</sup> *La Roumanie* and *L'Indépendance Roumaine*, 23. v. 16. Ionescu thereupon returned the Insignia of the Red Eagle as well.

On the 26th May the King spoke in admiration of the Austrian offensive in Italy, but said that "at the time" co-operation with Austria was impracticable. He expressed himself delighted at the economic *rapprochement* with the Central Powers. [No. 54].

Of the meaning of this last phrase there is no hint given in the Red Book. From *The Times* (1st, 2nd May, 1st, 9th June) it appears that the contract to supply 500,000 tons of wheat to Germany had been fulfilled: 1,000,000 tons of cereals had been exported to Germany; whilst half of the 800,000 tons promised to Great Britain had been delivered. According to the *Neue Freie Presse* of Vienna [Nov. 30th, 1916] between Dec., 1915, and Aug., 1916, Roumania sold the Central Powers over 20 million *centners* of corn.

Roumania also engaged to supply Turkey with petrol, benzol, and wheat in exchange for tobacco.

In June, 1916, Brusilov's great offensive was producing a marked effect on Roumanian public opinion [No. 55, 10th June: *cf. Times*, 24th June, 1916]. The Russians had advanced to Buczasz and Stremenec on the Strypa, and by June 22nd had occupied Czernowitz and Luck, and were thus on the Northern Roumanian frontier on the river Pruth.

A Russian cavalry patrol crossed the Roumanian frontier at Herța (on the Pruth) and was disarmed and interned. Another detachment crossed the Pruth at Mamornița, and overwhelmed the



frontier-guard. Prompt measures were taken to prevent further infractions [Nos. 56, 57 and 58]. Another patrol by mistake penetrated as far inland as Dorogoe [No. 59]. This news was by no means unwelcome at Galați [12th June; No. 59].

On the 17th June Czernin was fully satisfied at the proper attitude observed by Roumania; Brătianu inclined to think that these infractions might have been *ballons-d'essai* to see how Roumania would behave.

Take Ionescu and Filipescu were urging instant action by Roumania: but the King was adverse. [No. 60].

Czernin had been home to Vienna, and on the 19th June sends a despatch summarizing the situation. "Brătianu was sitting between two stools; he must not miss the opportunity of sharing in the Entente's victory, but he must throw in his lot as late as possible, and with the least hazard. Generally speaking, we stand in Roumania as we were a year ago. The evanesced hopes of Transylvania are budding anew: the break-up of the Monarchy is reassuming shape and form: and, as he had said a year ago, Roumanian policy will be decided by the fortune of war." [No. 61].

§9.—Czernin's "diagnosis of the psychology" of Roumania, was so far accurate: the situation had not changed materially in the course of the year. But popular agitation was slowly sapping the cautious prevarications of the government. Probably Russia was offering large baits to Roumania.

Czernin surmised that Brătianu demanded a progressive Russian campaign in the Bucovina, an insurance against Bulgaria, and a certain amount of armaments, before he would join in; also that Roumania should get the Bucovina, Transylvania and the Banat, and should declare war against Austria, not against Germany. [No. 66].<sup>119</sup> There was, therefore, no instant danger [24th June; No. 62]. The munitions were to arrive, partly by sea at Archangel and Vladivostók, partly on the "Bistrița" [which was torpedoed by the Germans on or about the 16th October together with the Roumanian vessel "Mercator"] [*Times*, 16th Oct., 1916, 5d]<sup>120</sup> [No. 65]: and Roumanian officers had been designated to receive them [12th July; No. 71 and 72].

Brătianu is said to have stated that diplomatic negotiations were on foot with Russia, which would take over two months; he could therefore partially demobilize the army.<sup>121</sup>

These negotiations were slow: in 1915 Russia would not admit the Roumanian claim to Czernowitz; now Russia demanded Bucovina.<sup>122</sup>

<sup>119</sup> This proviso again shows the exact similarity with the Italian negotiations of 1914-15. Italy's declaration of war in 1915 was only against Austria, with whom she had a lawful quarrel: on Aug. 28, 1916, she at last formally declared war against Germany. Germany, by declaring war on Roumania, at once destroyed the last ceremonial shreds of the Triple Alliance.

<sup>120</sup> This fact together with the submarine activity off the Norwegian coast provides a partial clue to the shortage of ammunition in Roumania.

<sup>121</sup> *Köln. Ztg.*, 28. vj. 16.

<sup>122</sup> *Steagul*, 1. vij. 16.

Costinescu was the only minister in favour of accepting the proposals of the Entente.<sup>123</sup>

However, Russia is said at last to have promised the Bucovina, Transylvania, Máramáros, the Roumanian Banat, the Theiss up to Groszwardein (Nagyvárad), and the districts of Kahal, Bolgrad and Izmail in Bessarabia.<sup>124</sup> This is the first time Russia had conceded anything in Bessarabia; and these offers were still considered insufficient: for Russia did not propose sending an army numerous enough to "aid effectively." It was urged that Roumania must not take the final step save to gain her national ends.<sup>125</sup> It was also suggested that Roumania had been guaranteed Bulgarian territory from Ruščuk (Ruse) to Varna in addition.<sup>126</sup>

These press accounts cannot be authoritative, but they help to define the situation described in a despatch from Burián to Prince Hohenlöhle.

At Berlin [18th July, 1916; No. 74] Burián gives a hint of the contents of some of the negotiations with Russia: viz., a secret treaty; a promise of certain Austro-Hungarian territories; a military convention between Russia and Roumania; a free passage for the Russian troops in Roumania; the fixing of a period, as brief as might be between the contract and the declaration of war.

<sup>123</sup> *Steagul*, 9. vij. 16.

<sup>124</sup> *Steagul*, 15. vij. 16; *Rússkoye Slóvo*, 28. vij. 16.

<sup>125</sup> *Kreutzztg.*, 20. vij. 15, quoting *Indépendance Roumaine*.

<sup>126</sup> *Neue Zürcher Ztg.*, 30. vij. 16. Something of this is probably true but it is coloured by German propaganda.

The Entente intended an offensive against Bulgaria, so as to divert the Bulgarian troops. [18th July, 1916; No. 74].

The King was still doubtful of the ultimate success of the Russian offensive [24th June; No. 62]: and denied that the last Cabinet Council had voted any resolution to join the Entente: at any rate, says Czernin, this intimation [25th June] was the first from the lips of the King that "the course of following Italy's example had been mooted in a Cabinet Council: and the implication was clear that Brătianu might avail himself of a further Russian advance, to quit "neutrality." [No. 63].

Similarly Brătianu denied any such resolution [June 27th], and declared he would endeavour to withstand any pressure tending towards war. [No. 64].

On the 27th it is anticipated that a Crown Council will be summoned to solve the crisis.<sup>127</sup>

Meantime munitions were passing through Russia for Roumania [No. 65]; and a very serious explosion occurred at the State Powder Factory at Dudeşti.<sup>128</sup>

Czernin considered that Roumania would not take the final step for six or eight weeks from the 28th June, as the Entente had not been successful enough, the munitions had not arrived, and the harvest had not been reaped.

Czernin hints that Russia had declined to de-

<sup>127</sup> *Viitorul*, 27. vij. 16.

<sup>128</sup> *Rússkoye Slóvo*, 28. vij. 16.



liver the munitions without a binding declaration from Brătianu.

The despatch No. 66 is one of those which shew signs of special re-editing: it winds up with a windy declamation: "The hesitation of a Hohenzollern to incur the despicable treachery of blood-guilt to his own kin is at least observable." [No. 66].

On the 30th June, there was another interview with Brătianu, who asseverated the strain of holding back. The Russians were advancing: the Bucovina was his for the asking: should the Russians penetrate into Transylvania, there would be no holding back the people. "Roumanian policy, like all else in Europe, is an immediate and direct reflexion of military results; only more so than it was last year."

Czernin repeats his expectation that the crisis will come about in six or eight weeks. [Nos. 67 and 68].

On the 7th July Czernin reports that the Powers of the Entente have "singly" (not collectively) intimated to Roumania that if she does not strike now, she will have no voice in the peace negotiations.

Filipescu and Take Ionescu, the pro-belligerent were not admitted to the Cabinet. [No. 69].

On the 12th July Czernin reports further preparations, the anti-Zeppelin blackening of the street-lamps, laying in of provisions in the larger towns; he anticipated the crisis in four week's time. Costinescu, the Minister of Finance, now adhered

to the war-party [Nos. 70 and 71]: an allegation he denied [No. 75; 18th July].

On the 18th July Burián instructed Czernin to approach the King, not Brătianu, and to inform him that one of the treaty obligations was not to entertain any alliance or obligation directed against any of the contracting powers: a duty which the Monarchy had scrupulously observed; when entering into new relations with other States, it had always regarded the treaty obligations towards Roumania. [No. 73].

Burián omits to state that Roumania was never consulted when the first Serbian note was despatched: and Austria therefore broke the spirit, if not the letter of the Alliance. [*Cf.* No. 4 *antea*].

In a despatch of the 19th July, Czernin surmises that war *may* be declared in the second half of August, when the foreign munitions were due to arrive. [Nos. 76 and 77].

Brătianu staunchly denied having entered into any binding agreement: he would rather resign than enter into the war at this time (26th July). He was waiting, until the Russians had a reverse, which would cool the ardour of the Roumanians, but to refuse to entertain the suggestions of the Entente would provoke a revolution. [No. 78; 26th July]. However, should the Monarchy disintegrate, "*la Roumanie ne peut rester à l'écart.*"

Czernin also interviewed the King separately, who regretted he could not follow the example of

his uncle (King Charles), who had said: "If Italy attacked Austria, it would be an abomination (*Schweinerei*) of which a Hohenzollern could not be guilty." The only remedy, now, was to terrorize the Roumanian Government with the fear of an invasion by Germans from Transylvania and 500,000 Bulgarians in the Dobrudja. [No. 81].

On the 26th or 27th Czernin had an audience of the King, and conveyed to him the message in No. 73 (*v. antea*). The King for the time being would not betray neutrality. It never occurs to Czernin, that the King, in complying with Brătianu's advice, was not a mere passive agent, but positively constitutional. [No. 80].

In the interview with Brătianu [Nos. 78 and 81] the phrase occurs: "We (the Monarchy) would not revive the *ancient theme* of treaty obligation and political morals: but Brătianu might like to know, we could face a declaration of war quite coolly." Amongst the many lapsed documents, does this refer to a formal rescission of the Treaty of Alliance, and a formal breakdown of the negotiations for the cession of territory: presumably on the question of Transylvania? The speculation is not so wild: the analogy of the Italian negotiations: the demand for Trieste, and the abrupt refusal of Italy to continue the dilatory measures furnish a likely analogy.

At any rate, in point of fact, whoever may have been the real aggressor, the Austrian Embassy

made early preparations to leave Bucarest. These were started on the 1st August [No. 82]: the Dutch Government was approached [Nos. 88, 94 and 100; 7th August]. On the 14th Aug. confidential documents were clandestinely removed. [Nos. 94 and 101].

**The declaration of War.** § 10.—The last section has scarcely carried the narrative any farther: it has merely re-iterated and re-acerbated the points of difference, the vague suspicions, the distrust and secret precautionary measures. As Czernin forecast, whether from knowledge of what was projected by the Central Powers, or by Roumania, or by a process of intelligent anticipation, the war came about in the latter part of August, 1916.

The *Kölnische Zeitung* [Times, July 28th, 1916] had cautioned Roumania not to be enticed by the allurements of the Entente; nor to submit to "decisive language" from Russia and England: "the example of Italy should be a warning to Roumania."

It is generally safe to interpret German official prognostication by the opposite: to read "Menacing notes from the Central Powers" in place of "Terrorism by England and Russia."

The course of the last negotiations can be briefly traced.

On the first of August Czernin objected to the concentrations of troops on the Hungarian frontier, and Brătianu tried to explain them away, and



denied that he was contemplating abandoning neutrality : Czernin attributes this reluctance to the poor success of the Russians and the military menace of the Bulgarian troops. [Nos. 83, 84, 85; 1st, 2nd and 3rd of Aug., 1916].

As a result of this Bulgarian activity the inhabitants of Giurgevo were in a state of feverish excitement and moving away. [7th Aug.; No. 89].

The outlook was dubious. Czernin states on the 3rd Aug. that orders had been given a fortnight previously with the intention of striking. [No. 85]. Burián sought for instructions at Berlin, requesting authorization to present the following note :—

“ Confiant dans les assertions de M. Bratiano que la Roumanie repousserait par la force toute atteinte armée à sa neutralité, éventualité qui—à l’instar de l’incident de Mamornița—pourrait se renouveler d’un jour à l’autre dans des dimensions bien autrement sérieuses, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal dans l’intention d’éclairer et de rassurer dès à présent le Gouvernement Roumain, lui fait savoir que dans le cas où le Gouvernement Roumain ne se trouverait, ou ne se croirait pas à même de s’opposer efficacement à une invasion de l’armée russe, il prendra de sa part toutes les mesures militaires que la sécurité des frontières austro-hongroises exigerait, et qui seraient jugées nécessaires pour rétablir un état de choses qui permettrait à la Roumanie de garder sa neutralité.” [7th Aug., 1916; No. 87].

This step was approved by Prince Hohenlohe. [8th Aug., 1916; No. 91].

On the 8th Aug. Czernin had another conversation with Brătianu. Brătianu at last made the long-expected request for blackmail: Austria might help him to maintain neutrality by a territorial offer in the Bucovina. The despatch continues: "I was the better able to decline, as I not only know your [Burián's] intentions in this matter, but have always been of the opinion that a territorial concession in return for neutrality was quite out of the question. Roumania would accept such a concession, but would still attack us later on, when she thought we were beaten, thus to get more."

The conversation began with Czernin's remonstrances at the continued movements of the troops. Czernin said plainly: that "if Brătianu wanted to have war, he might and should; but he must not think me such a simpleton, as not to see through his preparations."

Brătianu rejoined that these measures were precautionary, and a concession to the national feeling. The Bulgarians might attack.

Czernin, thereupon, suggested to Brătianu that he might demobilize, declare absolute neutrality, and Czernin would guarantee immunity.

"Brătianu replied that we had hundreds of spies, whilst he knew little of the Bulgarian movements: furthermore, he could not demobilize for internal reasons. Czernin must trust him, and he would do all he could to maintain neutrality." [No. 90].

The vigour and heat of this despatch make it noteworthy.

But is it probable that Brătianu, who, whatever his faults, as seen by his enemy, was astute and cautious, would have blurted out a sudden request for Austrian territory?

For, evidently, Burián had given instructions for this contingency: these are not published in the Red Book.

The offer to guarantee the neutrality and inviolability of Roumania can hardly have been serious: if it were, Brătianu's reply is eminently discreet; he might have said much more.

Moreover, there is no mention of the presentation of the formula agreed upon with Prince Hohenlohe [No. 87]. Was this strong threat never used?

The only plausible explanation of this despatch is that it is one of a suppressed series, in which specious offers had been made of Austrian or Hungarian territory, as compensation for Austrian aggrandisement in the Balkans; and Czernin's remark that Roumania would swallow such a concession, merely to fall on Austria later, is exactly paralleled by Mérey's<sup>120</sup> observation (in the Second Austro-Hungarian Red Book, No. 33; 5th Aug., 1914).

"I fear that Italy is trying to force us to continue the discussions of compensations and, excluding other compensations, may end by de-

<sup>120</sup> Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Rome.

manding the Trentino. Sooner or later Italy may quit her neutrality. If our group win rapidly, Italy may attach herself to it, and her demands for compensation be more modest; in the contrary event she might try to strengthen her moral pressure by military threats."

Other similar parallel passages might be quoted: the Austrians never understood their Southern allies' point of view, and always attributed foul motives. It was an unholy marriage in the first instance: the contract had been violated on the first occasion when it might have come into force.

The inconsequence of this part of the book is the best demonstration of its special pleading, if not, of the distortion of the documents. Until the Roumanian Government publishes an official account, there can be no true history.

The replies made by Czernin at the interview of the 8th August met with Burián's full approval. [9th August; No. 92].

It is quite possible, that, if we had the full documents, we should find that, as in the case of Italy, Roumania had formally rescinded the Treaty of Alliance, and was negotiating as a free agent.

On the 10th August Burián reports to Czernin that information was to hand that Roumania had concluded a military convention with Russia: and that a similar convention with the Quadruple Entente was in course of settlement. The only point of variance was said to be that Roumania stipu-



lated for a strong offensive from Salonica. [No. 93].

It may be significant that King Constantine of Greece was giving the Entente more trouble than usual at this period.

These negotiations with the Entente were not going altogether smoothly: for, on the 11th August, Czernin reports that the differences which arose a week ago were not appeased: and that Brătianu was averse to signing the agreement. [No. 95]. On the other hand, Hungary professed she would not regard Roumania as an enemy until she opened the door to the Russians.<sup>130</sup>

Meanwhile military preparations were proceeding apace: the classes 1896 to 1914 were summoned and being equipped [11th August; No. 16]: and trains between Brăila and Galați went at night darkened: the street-lamps in Bucarest had been blackened for some time. (v. No. 75). [No. 106; 24th August].

The King was still in absolute agreement with a policy of war. On the 12th August he said he hoped to get over this crisis [No. 97]; and on the 14th, Burián (who never grasped that the King, though personally consulted, was a constitutional Monarch and acted on advice) surmised that the King was not cognisant of the extent of the military preparations; that he was rushed into the conflict in the dark by Brătianu. [No. 99]. Such

<sup>130</sup> *Pesti Hírlap*, 14. viij. 16

conduct would have been treachery. There was no sign of Roumanian intervention as yet in Germany.<sup>131</sup>

On the 19th August, Czernin reported to Burián that "according to confidential information in Court circles" [*sic*]<sup>132</sup> the King is gradually being made to realise that a Brătianu Ministry will no longer do, and must be replaced by a Conservative Maiorescu group. Brătianu is going too fast; and the King is reluctant to fight the Central Powers, until they are finally defeated. [No. 102]. It is curious that Czernin, according to these documents, had no audience of the King from the 27th July [Nos. 80 and 81] to the 26th August [No. 108], nor with Brătianu between the 8th August [No. 90] and the 26th Aug. [No. 109].

This gap of interviews is closely paralleled in the Italian Book, when, after the great break and the denunciation of the Treaty of Alliance on May 3rd, there were no interviews between May 6th and May 17th and 18th, when the alliance was denounced. This period in Italy was occupied with the reconstruction of the Government for war. What was happening in Roumania between the 8th and 26th August? This time the Austrians do not tell a full and complete story.

On the 21st August King Ferdinand returned

<sup>131</sup> *Frankfurterztg*, 17. viij. 16.

<sup>132</sup> Cf. that in 1915 the King's physician, a German, had to be dismissed as he was convicted of spying for Germany [*Nieuwe Courant*, 18. viij. '15].

to Bucarest, and Maiorescu left Gmünden in Austria: on what mission he was at the Austrian Court does not appear. Russia also allowed the munitions ordered to be sent to Roumania.<sup>133</sup>

On the 20th August Czernin reports to Burián, though not as a certainty, on the strength of news from abroad, that a political convention was definitely signed between Roumania and Russia, and the remainder of the ambassadors of the Entente at Bucarest had been instructed to adhere to it. [No. 103].

On the 22nd August Burián requests Czernin to draw the attention of the King and Brătianu to the large concentrations of troops on the Hungarian frontier and the comparative denudation on the Russian. [No. 104].

On the 25th extraordinary military credits of 600-800 million francs were issued. [No. 107].

According to *The Times* of the 22nd August, it is still evident that the course of events is doubtful; for, in the same columns, Karl von Wiegand in the *New York World*, reports that Roumania will not enter the war; and that she has discharged all Germans and Austrians and Jews employed in her munition works; leaving only 900 persons working on them. "That, with the present supply, it would be national suicide to enter a war which might last more than a week."

Whereas the *Kreuzzeitung* of the 20th or 21st

<sup>133</sup> *Libertatea*, 21. viij. 16.

states that the negotiations which took place on the 20th with the Roumanian Minister of War, in the presence of the Russian military *attaché*, must be considered as a proof that Roumania has joined the Entente.

The next day's news shows the same uncertainty. The Bulgaro-German troops invaded Greek Macedonia, offering Greece full guarantees and indemnities (thus rendering an advance from Salonica hazardous and forestalling any offensive): whilst the *Frankfurterzeitung* is informed that the Roumanian Government has ordered diplomatic messengers to travel *viâ* Russia and Sweden.

Yet a Zürich telegram announces that a third contract has been signed between the Roumania Exportation Commission and the Central Powers: the goods to be delivered before the end of September.

On the 25th, according to the *Berliner Tageblatt*, the temporary tranquility apparently prevailing in Roumania must not be interpreted as meaning that that country does not think of intervention. "Brătianu will certainly intervene, but it appears that the various governments have not yet come to an understanding whether Roumania at the peace negotiations shall have a co-decisive, or only an advisory voice."

This daily quivering of the pendulum is reflected in the last despatches as published by the Austrian Government.

Czernin learned that a Crown Council was to be



convened in about a week's time, and all parties to be summoned, including the ministry, Filipescu and Take Ionescu, Carp, Maiorescu, Marghiloman and Rosetti. [23rd Aug.; No. 105].

This Council was convened for the 27th August. [26th Aug.; No. 108]. It would decide the question of peace and war.

On the 26th Czernin had an hour's audience of the King. He argued that Roumania was no longer, strictly speaking, neutral; whereas Austria-Hungary desired nothing more nor less than correct neutrality; and did not dread war, but must consider that any further preparations would directly involve a decisive attitude on the part of the Monarchy.

"The King replied in his characteristic vague manner. He said to-morrow would decide. He did not want war, but could not assume such a responsibility himself: hence the Crown Council. He hoped he might remain neutral. He believed that his army would not be willing to oppose any Russian invasion. He was not the master of his own wishes."

It was possible that the Brătianu ministry might be dismissed, and be replaced by a Conservative one under Maiorescu, who had not a majority in the Chamber, "although as the King affirmed, 90 per cent. of the people did not want war."

"The King fully understood that we could not tolerate any further increase in military strength,

and he affirmed that to-morrow would bring about disarmament, if neutrality were the outcome."

Czernin's impression was that the King hoped to retain his neutrality, but possibly Brătianu might coerce him. In to-morrow's Crown Council the favourers and opponents of war would be more or less balanced.

Czernin was convinced that the Entente and Brătianu were threatening the King with war; and, in the alternative, with allowing the Russians a passage through Roumania.

The official paper *Viitorul* urged an expectant and quiet attitude, and gave the impression that Brătianu would waver a while yet. [No. 107].

At the interview with Czernin on the same day, Brătianu stated most definitely he wanted neutrality and would and could remain neutral: the morrow would show he was speaking the truth. Probably Maiorescu wanted to succeed him in office. [No. 109].

On the 27th [No. 110] Roumania declared war in the following terms:—

The Alliance concluded between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy had, according to the declarations of the Governments themselves, only an essentially conservative and defensive character; its principal object was to guarantee the Allied countries against any attack from outside and to consolidate the state of things created by previous treaties.

It was with the desire to harmonize her policy

with these pacific tendencies that Roumania joined this alliance. Devoted to the work of her internal reconstruction, and faithful to her firm resolution to remain, in the region of the Lower Danube, an element of order and of equilibrium, Roumania has not ceased to contribute to the maintenance of peace in the Balkans.

The last Balkan wars, by destroying the *status quo*, imposed upon her a new line of conduct. Her intervention hastened peace and restored equilibrium. For herself, she was satisfied with a rectification of frontier which gave her greater security against an aggression, and which at the same time repaired the injustice committed to her detriment at the Berlin Congress. But, in the pursuit of this end, Roumania was disappointed to observe that she did not meet from the Cabinet of Vienna the attitude which she was entitled to expect.

When the present war broke out Roumania, like Italy, declined to associate herself with the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary, of which she had received no previous notice from the Cabinet of Vienna. In the spring of 1915 Italy declared war on Austria-Hungary; the Triple Alliance no longer existed.

The reasons which had determined the adherence of Roumania to this political system disappeared at the same time. Instead of a grouping of States seeking by common effort to work in agreement in order to assure peace and the conservation of the situations *de facto* and *de iure*

created by treaties, Roumania found herself in presence of Powers making war with the very object of transforming from top to bottom the old arrangements which had served as a basis for their Treaty of Alliance. These profound changes were for Roumania an evident proof that the object which she had pursued in adhering to the Triple Alliance could no longer be attained and that she must direct her views and her efforts towards new paths, the more so as the work undertaken by Austria-Hungary was assuming a character threatening the essential interests of Roumania as well as her most legitimate national aspirations.

In presence of so radical a modification of the situation created between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Roumania, the latter has resumed her liberty of action. The neutrality of the Royal Government, imposed upon itself in consequence of a declaration of war made without reference to its will and contrary to its interests, had been adopted, in the first instance, as the result of assurances given at the outset by the Imperial and Royal Government that the Monarchy, in declaring war upon Serbia, had not been inspired by a spirit of conquest and that it was in no way aiming at territorial acquisitions.

These assurances have not been fulfilled. To-day we find ourselves confronted by situations *de facto*, from which may arise great territorial transformations and political changes of a character constituting a grave menace to the security of the future



of Roumania. The work of peace which Roumania, faithful to the spirit of the Triple Alliance, had endeavoured to accomplish has thus been rendered fruitless by those very Powers who were called upon to support and defend it.

In adhering in 1883 to the group of the Central Powers Roumania, far from forgetting the ties of blood uniting the populations of the Kingdom with the Roumanian subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, had seen in the relations of friendship and alliance which had been established between the three Great Powers a precious pledge for her internal tranquility, as well as for the amelioration of the lot of the Roumanians of Austria-Hungary. In fact, Germany and Italy, who had reconstituted their States on the basis of the principle of nationality, could not but recognize the legitimacy of the foundation on which their own existence rested. As for Austria-Hungary, she found in the friendly relations established between herself and the Kingdom of Roumania assurances for her tranquility, both in her interior and on our common frontiers—for she was well aware to what an extent the discontent of her Roumanian population found an echo amongst us, threatening every moment to trouble the good relations between the two States.

The hope which we had based from this point of view upon our adhesion to the Triple Alliance has been disappointed. For a period of more than 30 years the Roumanians of the Monarchy not only have never seen a reform introduced of a nature

to give them any semblance of satisfaction, but they have, on the contrary, been treated as an inferior race and condemned to suffer the oppression of a foreign element which constitutes no more than a minority in the midst of the various nationalities of which the Austro-Hungarian State is composed. All the injustices which our brothers were thus made to suffer have fostered between our country and the Monarchy a continual state of animosity, which the Governments of the Kingdom only succeeded in appeasing at the cost of great difficulties and of numerous sacrifices.

When the present war broke out it might have been hoped that the Austro-Hungarian Government, at least at the last moment, would end by convincing itself of the urgent necessity of putting an end to this injustice, which endangered not only our relations of friendship but even the normal relations which ought to exist between neighbouring States.

Two years of war, during which Roumania has maintained neutrality, have proved that Austria-Hungary, opposed to all internal reform which could ameliorate the life of the peoples which she governs, has shown herself as ready to sacrifice them as she is powerless to defend them against external attack.<sup>134</sup>

<sup>134</sup> Evidence can be found to substantiate this charge. In October, 1915, there was a reign of terror in Transylvania [*Echo de Paris*, 10, x., '15]; so severe that the military were destroying the refugees' houses, imprisoning and deporting the population [*Adevărul*, 19. xj. '15]. In March, 1916, the paper *Românul* of

The war in which almost the whole of Europe is taking part revives the gravest problems affecting the national development and the very existence of States. Roumania, moved by the desire to contribute to hasten the end of the conflict and compelled by the necessity of safeguarding her racial interests, sees herself forced to enter into line with those who are better able to assure the accomplishment of her national unity.

For these reasons she considers herself from this moment in a state of war with Austria-Hungary.  
Bucarest, 14/27 August, 1916, 9 p.m.

EM. PORUMBARU.

What forced  
Roumania  
into war on  
27th August?

§ II.—The die was cast.

It is difficult to summarize this imperfect collection of documents with any preciseness.

Probably Brătianu was genuine and sincere: he did not desire war and dreaded it: but he was impelled by the national feeling, and could not give way: whereas the pro-Germans, and Conservatives and anti-Russians inclined definitely either to collaboration with the Central Powers or benevolent neutrality. The example of Bulgaria is not to the point: she had no *irredenta* administered by Magyars.

The King acted constitutionally. What inducements were offered or extorted in the way of terri-

Arad was suspended; and a number of writers on the paper *Tribuna* of Arad were condemned to death in their absence. They had fled to Roumania [*Adevărul*, 16. iii. 16].

torial concessions by Russia, or by Austria-Hungary, does not appear.<sup>135</sup>

One gross piece of mis-statement must yet be added.

On the 23rd Sept., 1916, Count Hadik, Austro-Hungarian Minister at Stockholm telegraphs to Burián to the effect that Czernin, on his way through Sweden sends a supplementary despatch—that on the 24th August Russia sent an ultimatum: promising on the one hand large accessions in Transylvania, the Banat and Bucovina and the Delta of the Danube; on the other an invasion with 100,000 men: Roumania must elect if they were to come as friends or foes.

The Crown Council had to face war as a *fait accompli*. At the very time when it was assembling, the Austro-Hungarian Legation was surrounded by a military *cordon*. “Brătianu gave me (Czernin) his word of honour to remain neutral, and put the responsibility for any other course on the King. [This is only partly corroborated by the despatch No. 109 to which it refers. There is no mention of the King]. Doubtless he would

<sup>135</sup> Further evidence is *La Tribuna*, 15. viij. 15 (quoting *Ixinte* to the effect that Austria-Hungary offered territorial concessions in return for neutrality, but withdrew the offer, as it had not been accepted within the time fixed, viz.: July; and also, *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant* stated that Russia, before starting her offensive, demanded the dismissal of the German artillery instructors in Roumania; and Great Britain wanted to negotiate on the basis of a cession of territory in Bessarabia, to include Kišinev and Mohilev, up to the river Kogilnik.



rather have waited: but, as I anticipated, the Entente forced matters by a sudden action."<sup>136</sup>

The members of the Legation and consulate and colony were interned at the Legation for ten days; and only provisioned at extortionate prices,—Czernin does not state that the Roumanian ministers were all sent through Russia and Sweden and detained on the Isle of Rügen for a similar period—and maltreatment of the Austrian Colony was general.

This extraordinary despatch bears marks of fabrication. There is no evidence given of this maltreatment. The *Neue Freie Presse* of Vienna [16th Oct., 1916] corroborates and extends the story that Czernin was forced by pangs of starvation after ten days to visit Brătianu, who still tried to be friendly: saying that Czernin must not take it amiss that Brătianu had lied: it was for the weal of Roumania. Czernin rejoined that the fraud was in vain: Austria was ready, and Roumania would soon learn this to her cost. And Czernin loftily "refused to shake hands with Brătianu."

The question remains, what of the Russian ultimatum. It is not mentioned in the Red Book in its place. Burián [No. 103] merely conjectures that a military convention has been signed with Russia. It would be incomprehensible that Austria, having early *knowledge* of this, should have failed to utilize so powerful an argument.

<sup>136</sup> Precedents for such promptness are rare.

Possibly, the next document, No. 111, is an afterthought and cloaks the fact that Austria acted on the threat contained in No. 108, that pressure should be put on Roumania: an insistence that Roumania should either side with the Central Empires, or be treated as an enemy would be the policy and interest of the Austro-German Alliance.

Brătianu was not ready for war: it was expedient to force war on to Roumania before her time and put the obloquy of treachery on to her. Such anyhow was the German precedent in creating war between Germany and Russia in 1914, the Austrian in enforcing hostilities between herself and Serbia in 1914, not to go back to the precedents of 1864, and 1870, when the same manoeuvre was adopted.

Anyhow this despatch is so inconsistent and so unreasonable, that it cannot be regarded as truthful.

The question, however, of the responsibility for the ultimatum that made Roumania declare war on the 27th August, 1916, is very doubtful. But since then there has been a revolution in Russia, and some of the veil of darkness has been lifted.

General Ilescu in an interview in the *Matin* [3 iv. 17] states that Roumania was not ready in August, 1916,<sup>137</sup> and that "towards this period a

<sup>137</sup> Cf. *Frankfurterztg* (3. viij. '16) to the effect that Russia intended annexing Roumania up to the Sereth. This allegation corresponds with the Russo-German bargain suggested by Ilescu. So, too, *Le Genevois* (cit. *Gazzetta Ticinese*, 17. iii. 17) learns from a very respectable source that by Stürmer's Russo-German

sort of summons from Russia reached us. 'Now or never,' said this document, the text of which I can put at your disposal.'

General Iliescu proceeds to show that the Russians proposed a plan of campaign for their convenience: and then withheld any support. "The defeat of Roumania was foreseen and organized by M. Stürmer, who wished to finish the war by this striking fact. . . . In my opinion, *this* was M. Stürmer's plan, when he forced our hand and organised our campaign:—to allow Roumania to be invaded as far as the Sereth, to allow the triumph of the military power of the Central Empires, to conclude a separate peace in consequence of the defeat, which would not be a *Russian* defeat, and consequently would not shake either his power, or that of the Tsar at all."

In the *Gazette de Lausanne* [7 iv. 17] N. P. Comneanu confirms this, adding that all Roumania knew of this betrayal; that he himself had seen the

peace, Roumania was to be divided between Russia and Austria. Russia was to annex Moldavia, while Austria-Hungary took Wallachia, and that was why the armies of Falkenhayn and Mackensen came to a stop at the Sereth.

For further confirmation cf. *Berner Tagwacht* (6. x. 16); that Roumania was the price of the Russo-German peace, and *Berner Tagblatt*, 20. x. 16.

Mr. Dillon in the House of Commons [*Hansard*, 20. ii. 17, p. 198 . . .] also corroborates the theory that Russia presented a premature ultimatum, when Roumania was unwilling and unready; and when Sarraïl had no men available to relieve the pressure. Cf. also the *Hannoverscher Kurier* (18. iii. 17) quoting from the German-controlled paper *Gazeta Bucureștilor* an article by Alexandru Beldiman.

French material of war held up by order on the Russian railways.

If so, the statement in the Austrian Red Book [No. 111; dated from Stockholm, 23 ix. 16] is borne out: but there still remains the curious fact that there is no mention in the text of the book, on the date specified, viz., August 24, 1916, of any report to this effect—nothing that could be “supplemented.”<sup>138</sup> This disparity is still unexplained.

Either, such a report exists and has been suppressed; or the arrangement of Stürmer and Protopopov with Berlin was negotiated, at any rate, over the head of Czernin at Bucarest. The object was to force Roumania into war to her own undoing and the easy victory of the Central Powers.

The dismissal of Stürmer soon followed, and Milyukov denounced his treachery in the Duma. [*Birževyya Vēdomosti*, 29 ix./12 xij. 16]. That monstrous act of ill-faith has contributed towards the downfall of institutions older and greater than that ministry.

But, to return to the question of this missing link; if this evidence were available, it would have been to the interest of the Austrians to proclaim it aloud in their Red Book: and therefore it is quite possible that the matter was engineered at Berlin, and Czernin himself was innocent and

<sup>138</sup> Zur *Ergänzung* meiner Berichterstattung aus Bukarest.



honestly surprised at the rapid and unexpected development.

In the fearful story of Roumania's disaster, there may yet be this two-fold consolation: first, it was the result of an incalculable and wicked intrigue; and, secondly, that Germany, as ever, reckoned amiss; for the stout and desperate resistance of the Roumanian forces weakened the Central Empires beyond their estimate: whilst the Russian people revolted against the perfidy of the Court, and, a few months later, overthrew the system of government that rendered it possible. As usual, Germany with all the laborious ingenuity of her forecast was never able to understand the minds of those with whom she intended dealing, possibly in self-conscious disregard of any such factors.

**Summary.** § 12.—It may be useful in conclusion to summarize these despatches which seem to throw some light on the course of events.

First. Roumania was inclined to enter on the war in August or September, 1914, when hostilities between Turkey and Greece were anticipated over the questions of the islands fronting the coast of Asia Minor. Roumania was not assured of the benevolent neutrality of Bulgaria and was deterred. But she was rigidly neutral, and as far as she could, stopped the passage of munitions to Turkey. The doubt as to Bulgaria, prevented from engaging herself when Turkey entered the field.

Second. The interval was apparently occupied

with bids from both sets of belligerents. Italy had failed to obtain compensations from Austria for the breach of Article VII. of the Triple Alliance, and there was every expectation that Roumania would strike in May with Italy. The danger was averted by the quasi-ultimatum of the 23rd May, 1915 [No. 31]: but the decision was no doubt influenced by the ill-success of the Russian arms.

Roumania could not be munitioned by sea and land, like Italy. The route to Archangel and Alexándrovsk was long and unreliable: supplies from Vladivostók were slow. The Quadruple Entente was bent on conciliating Bulgaria, and was niggardly in their offers in the Banat and Bucovina.<sup>139</sup> They were insistent that the Treaty of Bucarest, 1913, should be revised.<sup>140</sup> This was eminently just; but injudicious: Bulgaria did not deserve such punctilio. On the other hand the Central Powers were offering Roumania a rectification of the Transylvanian frontier.<sup>141</sup>

Third. Bulgaria entered the field against the Entente in October, 1915, and an effective invasion of Serbia was possible on two sides. On the 22nd Sept., 1915, Roumania was intimidated, and the third imminent risk of Roumanian participation passed away.

Fourth. Roumania armed herself anew, and in

<sup>139</sup> *Corriere della Sera*, 10. vj. 15; *Berliner Morgenpost*, 22. vj. 15.

<sup>140</sup> *Echo de Bulgarié*, 23. vj. 15; *Mir* (Sofia), 23. vj. 15.

<sup>141</sup> *La Tribuna*, 27. vj. 15.

August, 1916, joined the Allies. The circumstances are obscure. The Russian promises, as far as can be gathered, were more generous and included part of Bessarabia, besides Transylvania, the Roumanian Banat and the Bucovina.<sup>142</sup> Possibly the Central Powers forced the pace with a summary ultimatum, knowing that Roumania was still insufficiently armed, and that the submarines off the Norwegian Coast were intercepting her supplies: or the Russians did present a demand for a free passage: but it was in collusion with the enemy.

There was only one root and primal cause for the haggings and boggings during these two years, viz.: the injustice of the Treaty of Bucarest, 1913. Lord Grey, at the Conference of London, laboriously assigned just frontiers to Bulgaria and Greece and Serbia and Montenegro; he had modified them justly, when the Central Powers insisted on creating Albania. He had defeated Austria by giving the Balkan League no excuse to dissolve.

Austria instigated Bulgaria to attack her allies; miscalculated the result: and Bulgaria, crushed, was despoiled by Roumania, Serbia and Greece: and forfeited to Turkey Adrianople and the Enos-Midia frontier-line. On these rights Bulgaria properly stood firm, before October, 1915—on the restoration of her share. It was the impossibility of getting all of the other States to relinquish their portions of the Bulgarian boundaries (as

<sup>142</sup> *Steagul*, 15. vij. 16.

established at the Conference of London) that wrecked the schemes of the Entente: despite the allurements of compensation elsewhere. The wrong of the Treaty of Bucarest has exacted a frightful retribution.

Since the ink was wasted on these despatches, the big guns have spoken. Roumania, taken unawares before her time; with the diplomacy possibly mishandled by the Powers of the Entente, has suffered and lost. Very likely, too, she was hot-headed and plunged into a Transylvanian campaign instead of acting in concert with the Allies in Bulgaria.

Essentially, the fight is for Transylvania. Possibly—unless this is too Utopian—the time may come, when the wisdom of humanity may suffice to settle border disputes of neighbouring States by the wishes of these frontier-folk, by a kind of local option, or give-and-take, and not by the high rules of strategy, which scarcely seem to apply or meet the case.

For this is the crux of the matter: the inherent right of peoples to govern themselves in freedom.



## APPENDIX

### THE DECLARATIONS OF WAR

July	28th,	1914,	Austria against Serbia.
Aug.	1st,	„	Germany against Russia.
„	3rd,	„	Germany against France.
„	4th,	„	Great Britain against Germany.
„	10th,	„	France against Austria.
„	12th,	„	Great Britain against Austria.
Nov.	5th,	„	Great Britain, France, and Russia against Turkey.
May	23rd,	1915,	Italy against Austria.
Aug.	20th,	„	Italy against Turkey.
Oct.	6th,	„	Ultimatum, Bulgaria to Serbia.
„	6th,	„	France against Bulgaria.
„	6th,	„	Russia against Bulgaria.
„	15th,	„	Great Britain against Bulgaria.
„	19th,	„	Italy against Bulgaria.
Aug.	27th,	1916,	Roumania against Austria.
„	27th,	„	Germany against Roumania.
„	28th,	„	Italy against Germany.
„	31st,	„	Turkey against Roumania.
Sept.	3rd,	„	Bulgaria against Roumania.



## SOME USEFUL DATES.

These dates are generally chosen to illustrate Balkan history in relation to Turkish : they record in the main how these countries were conquered and redeemed. The authority is the *Historian's History*.

### SOME USEFUL DATES IN BALKAN HISTORY.

- 1258. Birth of Osman, the founder of the Osmanti or Turkish Empire.
- 1326. Capture of Brusa.
- 1330. Capture of Nicaea.
- 1336. Capture of Pergamum in Mysia.
- 1358. First Ottoman stronghold in Europe (Tzympe) captured.
- 1364. Murad I defeats King of Hungary and Poland and Princes of Bosnia Serbia and Wallachia on banks of Maritia.
- 1389. Battle of Kosovo. Murad defeats united forces of Serbia, Bosnia, Hungary, Albania and Wallachia.
- 1392. Mîrcea, of Wallachia, submits to the Turks.
- 1396. Battle of Nicopolis. Defeat of Sigismund, of Hungary, by Sultan Bayazid.
- 1402. Bayazid defeated and taken captive by Timur; in Mongol invasion.

- 1403-1413. Civil war in Turkey. Mohammed I wins.
1442. Hunyády defeats a Turkish Army at Hermannstadt.
1443. Hunyády routs the Turks at the Battle of Niš.
1444. Murad defeats the Christians at Varna.
1453. Mohammed II takes Constantinople.
1456. Siege of Belgrade. Mohammed II defeated by Hunyády and Giovanni di Capistrano.
1460. Mohammed conquers Morea and Athens.
1461. Scanderbeg wins independence as Prince of Albania and Epirus.
1475. Turks take the Crimea.
1492. Bayazid II repulsed at Belgrade.
1500. Turks take Lepanto, Modon, Córson and Durazzo from Venice.
1520. Accession of Suleiman the Magnificent.
1521. Conquest of Belgrade.
1526. Battle of Mohács, and subjugation of Hungary.
1529. Siege of Vienna and repulse of Turks.
1569. Turks repulsed by Russians at Astrakhan.
1571. Turks take Cyprus, but easily defeated at Lepanto.
1596. Battle of Keresztés. Allied forces of Austria and Transylvania defeated.
1606. Peace of Zsitvatorok between Turkey and Austria. Half of Transylvania redeemed; and Hungary relieved of tribute, though still subject to Turkey.



1664. Turks defeated by Austrians. Treaty of Vasvár, Transylvania evacuated. Apáfi recognised as Prince, under Turkish suzerainty.

Of the seven Hungarian Counties between the borders of Transylvania and the Theiss, three ceded to the Emperor, four remained Ottoman, as well as Novigrad and Neuhäusel.

1669. Candia (Crete) conquered by Turks. The Phanariots officially installed at Constantinople.

1672. Podolia and the Ukraine surrendered to Turkey.

1673. Poles, under Sobieski, defeat Turks at Choczym. Ukraine and Podolia remain Turkish.

1683. The second siege of Vienna: which is relieved by Sobieski of Poland.

1686. Austrians recapture Budapest.

1689. Austrians capture Belgrade.

1697. Battle of Zenta on Theiss. Turks defeated by Eugene of Savoy.

1699. Peace of Karlowitz. Turkey ceded Hungary and Transylvania to Austria, preserving the Banat. Poland recovered Podolia, Kamenec-Podolski and the Ukraine. Russia kept Azov.

1711. Turkish war with Russia. Turks recapture Azov.

1715. Turkey recaptures Morea from Venice.

1716. Beginning of Phanariot rule in Wallachia.
1718. Treaty of Passarowitz (Požarevac). Capture of Belgrade. Belgrade, Banat of Temesvár, Wallachia to the Alt, and part of Serbia ceded to Austria. Sultan retains the Morea.
1739. Treaty of Belgrade. Austria ceded to Turkey, Belgrade, Shabats, Serbia, Austrian Wallachia, Orșova. Russia ceded Azov and the right of navigating in the Black Sea, or Sea of Azov.
1761. First treaty between Prussia and Turkey; war projected against Austria.
1767. War between Russia and Turkey.
- 1770-71. Russians conquer Moldavia, Wallachia and Crimea.
1774. Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji. Turkey ceded to Russia fortresses on Delta of Danube, and in Crimea.
1788. Russo-Turkish War.
1798. Napoleon invades Egypt.
1804. Successful revolt of Serbia.
1809. Russo-Turkish War.
1812. Treaty of Bucarest. Bessarabia ceded to Russia.
1821. Greek War of Independence.
1829. Treaty of Adrianople. Russia secured Delta of Danube, and a Protectorate over the Roumanian principalities, which she occupied for six years.
1832. Greece declared independent.

- 1848. Revolt in Moldavia and Wallachia, which were occupied by Russia up to 1850.  
Revolt of Hungary against Austria.
- 1853. Russo-Turkish War and Crimean War.
- 1856. Treaty of Paris. Independence and integrity of Turkey recognised. Bessarabia was restored to the Roumanian Principalities, over which the Russian protectorate was abolished and replaced by the Collective Guarantee of the Great Powers.
- 1866. German dynasty established in Roumania under Prince Charles zu Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen.
- 1867. Transylvania ceded by Austria to Hungary.
- 1870. Russia repudiates neutrality of Black Sea, and England acquiesces.
- 1875. Bosnia and Hercegovina revolt.
- 1876. Bulgaria revolts. Serbia and Montenegro in arms.
- 1877. Russo-Turkish War.
- 1878. Treaty of San Stefano. Bulgaria created; Roumania made independent: Bessarabia re-ceded to Russia; Roumania, Dobrudja and Delta.
- 1878. Congress of Berlin. Austria "occupies provisionally" Bosnia-Hercegovina.
- 1881. Roumania a Kingdom, under King Charles.
- 1883. Great Britain administers Egypt.
- 1883. Alliance of Roumania with Central Powers.
- 1885. Eastern Rounelia revolts and joins Bulgaria.

- 1887. Bulgaro-Serbian War. Serbs defeated.
- 1894. Armenian massacres.
- 1896. Cretan revolt.
- 1897. Greco-Turkish War. Greeks defeated.
- 1898. Prince George of Greece, High Commissioner of Crete, which is redeemed from Turkey.
- 1902-3. Macedonian Massacre.
- 1904. Macedonia placed under international control.
- 1908. Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria declares himself independent, and King. Austria-Hungary annex Bosnia-Hercegovina.
- 1911-12. Turco-Italian War. Italy annexes Tripoli.
- 1912-13. First Balkan War. Turkey surrenders all of Macedonia and Balkans down to Enos-Midia line.  
Second Balkan War. Turkey recovers Adrianople. Treaty of Bucarest. Roumania extends her frontier in Dobrudja.
- 1914. European War.
- 1915. Armenian massacres.
- August, 1916—Roumania enters the war.



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
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